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INTRODUCTION
In November 1977, Bernice Rosenfeld's automobile struck
Donna Houghton's automobile from behind.' Houghton sued
Rosenfeld for the injuries she sustained in the collision.2 Ro-
senfeld's insurer, New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Com-
pany, defended the action.3 While preparing for trial, the
insurance company requested4 that Equifax, a consumer report-
ing agency,5 investigate Houghton and prepare a written report
including general financial information. 6 Equifax submitted to
the insurance company a report containing information ob-
tained from public records, personal interviews with Hough-
ton's neighbors,7 and existing credit fles.8 Houghton did not
1. Brief for Appellee at 4, Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795
F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1601), revg 615 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
2. Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 299, 301 (E.D. Pa.
1985), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1986). Houghton also included a claim for
lost earnings. Id.
3. I& at 304 (the insurance company defended Rosenfeld as required by
its contract with her).
4. The insurance company submitted its request on a preprinted form
supplied by Equifax, indicating that it sought the report to investigate Hough-
ton's claims in a lawsuit against its insured. I&. at 301 n.1.
5. A "consumer reporting agency" is an individual or corporation
which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on con-
sumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third par-
ties, and which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for
the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603, 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1982). For the definition
of "consumer report," see infra note 20.
6. Houghton, 615 F. Supp. at 301. The insurance company asked Equifax
to investigate Houghton's activities since the accident, her medical history, and
her general financial condition. Id.
7. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Equifax Servs., Inc., Houghton v. New
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receive notice of the insurance company's request for the report
and did not know that the report existed.9 In November 1979,
Houghton settled her claim with the insurance company.10
Four years later, Houghton learned of Equifax's report and
requested that the insurance company disclose the substance of
the report to her.1 1 The insurance company repeatedly refused
to disclose the report.12 Houghton then filed suit in federal dis-
trict court alleging that the insurance company' 3 had violated
provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act14 (FCRA) that
mandate notice and disclosure15 to consumers16 by users1 7 of
"investigative consumer reports.' 8 On motion for summary
judgment, the insurance company argued that the Equifax re-
Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1601) (copy of
Equifax's report appended to the brief). The interviews reflect information
dangerous to consumers because it is colored by the source's perceptions and
biases. For example, one neighbor judged Houghton's financial status based on
one factor, the number and make of the family cars. Id The bank, however,
may have owned the cars and every other asset Houghton possessed.
8. Houghton, 615 F. Supp. at 302. Equifax's report stated, "We did check
available credit files through a confidential source, and we are unable to come
up with any financial irregularities." Id. at 302 n.2.
9. Id at 301. See infra note 60 and accompanying text concerning notice
and disclosure requirements for investigative consumer report users under the
Fair Credit Reporting Act.
10. Houghton, 615 F. Supp. at 302.
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Houghton has filed a separate lawsuit against Equifax which is cur-
rently pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Houghton v. Equifax, Inc., No. 85-2855 (E.D. Pa. filed May 21,
1985). This suit was stayed pending the resolution of outstanding criminal
charges filed against Houghton. Brief for Appellant at 5, Houghton v. New
Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1601).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t.
15. Id § 1681d. Houghton alleged violations of §§ 1681d(a) and 1681d(b) of
the FCRA. These provisions require users of investigative consumer reports
to notify the consumer of the report, disclose the report's nature, and make
further disclosures upon written request by the consumer. See infra note 60
and accompanying text.
16. The FCRA defines "consumer" as an "individual." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(c).
17. The FCRA distinguishes between users of consumer information and
consumer reporting agencies, imposing different obligations on each. See infra
notes 49-64 and accompanying text.
18. The FCRA defines an "investigative consumer report" as:
a consumer report or portion thereof in which information on a con-
sumer's character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or
mode of living is obtained through personal interviews with neigh-
bors, friends, or associates of the consumer reported on or with others
with whom he is acquainted or who may have knowledge concerning
any such items of information.
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port did not constitute an "investigative consumer report"
within the meaning of the FCRA.19 Because the FCRA's "in-
vestigative consumer report" definition is derived from that
statute's "consumer report" definition,20 the determinative is-
sue was whether Equifax's report was a "consumer report"
within the Act's scope.21 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found for Houghton 22 and
granted her $14,770 in damages and attorneys fees.23
In Houghton v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co.,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.2 The Third Cir-
cuit held that the FCRA did not apply to the Equifax report be-
cause the report neither appeared on its face to be a consumer
report,25 nor had the insurance company requested the report
for a purpose that would render it a consumer report under the
FCRA.2 6 The insurance company, therefore, was not legally
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(e) (emphasis added). See infra note 20 for the FCRA's defi-
nition of a "consumer report."
19. Houghton, 615 F. Supp. at 302.
20. An "investigative consumer report" is a species of "consumer report,"
differing only in the method by which the information is collected. See supra
note 18. Thus, a court must first determine whether a "consumer report" ex-
ists before considering provision- 71pplicable to an "investigative consumer re-
port."
The FCRA defines consumer report as
any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, per-
sonal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be
used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a
factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for (1) credit or insur-
ance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes,
or (2) employment purposes, or (3) other purposes authorized under
section 1681b of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d).
21. No party disputed that an investigation as contemplated by the "inves-
tigative consumer report" definition had occurred. The insurance company ex-
pressly hired Equifax to conduct a "Special Activities Check." See Brief for
Amicus Curiae, Equifax Servs., Inc., Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.,
795 F.2d 1144 (3rd Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1601) (copy of request form appended to
the brief). Equifax's Special Activity Check necessarily involved "personal in-
terviews with neighbors" as required by the investigative consumer report def-
inition. Id
22. Houghton, 615 F. Supp. at 304-05.
23. Id at 310. The court awarded Houghton $3,500 in compensatory dam-
ages, $3,500 in punitive damages, $7,770 for attorney's fees, and $1,284.66 in
costs. Id.
24. Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1986),
rev g 615 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
25. Id at 1147. See injfra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
26. Id. at 1148. See infra notes 10410 & 117-23 and accompanying text.
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obligated to comply with the FCRA's notice and disclosure
provisions.27
The Third Circuit in Houghton interpreted narrowly the
FCRA's consumer report definition in a suit against a user of
consumer reports.28 The consumer report definition is crucial
because it controls the Act's applicability-generally, consum-
ers enjoy the Act's protections only when a consumer report is
involved.29 Adoption of the Houghton court's narrow interpre-
tation in a suit against a consumer reporting agency, the pri-
mary entity regulated by the FCRA, would limit drastically the
Act's scope. Such a limitation would jeopardize consumer
rights with respect to the reporting industry and frustrate con-
sumers' ability to avoid erroneous reporting. The threat of er-
roneous reporting is significant; the consumer reporting
industry issues more than one hundred million consumer re-
ports annually,30 and approximately five million consumers are
victims of inaccurate reporting each year.31
This Comment rejects the Third Circuit's interpretation of
the FCRA. Part I introduces the FCRA's legislative history
and scope provisions, and examines pre-Houghton case law in-
terpreting the Act's scope. Part II analyzes the Houghton deci-
27. Id. at 1150. For a discussion of the FCRA's notice and disclosure pro-
visions, see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 104-23 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 54-60 & 64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the Act's protections that do not hinge on the information's status as a con-
sumer report, see infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
30. Fair Credit Reporting Act - 1973: Hearings on S. 2360 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Credit of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2360](testimony of Mr. John L. Spafford, President, Associated Credit Bureaus,
Inc., that the association's members, representing 80 to 90% of the industry,
released 100 million reports in 1972). One consumer reporting agency alone
currently receives 100,000 requests for consumer reports daily. Boothe v. TRW
Credit Data, 557 F. Supp. 66, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
31. See Ackerley v. Credit Bureau, 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D.C. Wyo. 1974)
(stating that one out of every 20 reports contains material errors).
Massive dissemination to meet demand combined with agency policies that
reward employees for high output lead to the considerable number of report-
ing inaccuracies. Equifax, for example, pays each investigator a bonus based
on output. Hauser v. Equifax, Inc., 602 F.2d 811, 815 (8th Cir. 1979). Similarly,
O'Hanlon Reports pays its investigators a commission equal to one third of the
fee charged to the client requesting the report. Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports,
Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 273 (E.D. Mo. 1974), affd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
An employee's incentive to maximize income naturally creates high volume
reporting. Indeed, Equifax's investigators prepare approximately 12 to 15 re-
ports daily, see Hauser, 602 F.2d at 815, and O'Hanlon's investigators average
140-160 reports every two weeks. Millstone, 383 F. Supp. at 273.
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sion and its resolution of the statutory construction issue. Part
III analyzes the problems posed by the ambiguity of the
FCRA's definition of consumer report and proposes that courts
read the Act's definitional section broadly and differentiate be-
tween user and reporting agency defendants. The Comment
concludes that the proposed approach would achieve results
consistent with legislative intent and ensure consumer
protection.
I. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT AND
PRE-HOUGHTON INTERPRETATIONS
As consumer reporting agencies operating on a national
scale began computerizing their operations,3 2 Congress passed
the FCRA in 197033 to address mounting concerns about report-
32. The rapid proliferation of reporting operations facilitated by com-
puters and the new capabilities for interlocking data bases was the impetus for
Congress's heightened concern for consumers' privacy. See generally Commer-
cial Credit Bureaus: Hearings Before a Special House Subcomm. on Invasion
of Privacy of the Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1968) [hereinafter Privacy Hearings] (exploring the privacy and due process
issues raised by the credit reporting industry's growth and modes of opera-
tion). In 1966, the executive branch had suggested establishing a national data
bank containing information on every U.S. citizen to be used to evaluate gov-
ernment programs and policies. Id. at 2. "The 'big-brother is watching' over-
tones of this project plus congressional opposition led to its quick
abandonment." 115 CONG. REC. 2411 (1969) (statement of Senator Proxmire);
see generally McNamara, The Fair Credit Reporting Act" A Legislative Over-
view, 22 J. PUB. L. 67, 71-73 (1973) (reviewing the rise and fall of the national
data bank concept). An analogous data bank, however, was developing in the
private sector without any public safeguards. 115 CONG. REC. 2411 (1969)
(statement of Senator Proxmire). One credit reporting agency was growing at
a rate of 50,000 new files a week and estimated that nearly every adult in the
United States would be in its computer data bank within five years. Id. at
2410. See also id. at 33,408 (statement of Senator Proxmire) (computerized re-
porting industry has capability of covering every U.S. citizen, and nearly every
adult is currently covered).
Errors in data reporting were common, see Privacy Hearings, supra, at
109 (statement of Senator Proxmire) (approximately one percent of all reports
disseminated mistake the identity of the report's subject); see also supra note
31, and computerization foreshadowed wider distribution of harmful data.
Senator Proxmire consequently introduced the Fair Credit Reporting Bill,
which was the first serious attempt at comprehensive regulation of the indus-
try. 115 CONG. REc. 2410 (1969); see McNamara, supra, at 69 (the first credit
reporting bill, introduced by Congressman Zablocki of Wisconsin in 1968, was
never reported out of committee).
33. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1127 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982)) is Title VI of the Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act of 1968.
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ing abuses.34 Congress recognized that consumers faced an "or-
ganized conspiracy of silence"35 between agencies and users and
rarely discovered that a consumer report was the source of a
denial of consumer benefits36 until after significant injury had
occurred.3 7 Moreover, common-law remedies for the dissemina-
34. The committee report accompanying the Fair Credit Reporting Bill
summarized specific abuses identified during the Senate hearings. S. REP. No.
517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1969). Consumers generally had been unaware
that they had been damaged by adverse reports because the standard subscrip-
tion contract between an agency and its clients prohibited users from disclos-
ing the report's contents or the agency's identity. Id at 3; see also infra note
35. Even if the consumer did learn of the adverse report and the reporting
agency's identity, the agency would refuse the consumer access to her file and
would not reinvestigate or correct inaccurate information. S. REP. No. 517,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969). When challenged by a consumer, insurance re-
porting companies denied that they even made the alleged reports. I& Credit
bureaus wore down persistently inquisitive consumers by charging for reinves-
tigation services or by scheduling a requested interview weeks away. I&
Moreover, agencies had little respect for consumer confidentiality. For exam-
ple, a television reporter easily gained access to reports by posing as the repre-
sentative of a fictitious company claiming to offer the consumers credit. Id- at
4. Many reports containing highly personal information were based on subjec-
tive and biased opinions and often were irrelevant to the purpose for which
the report was requested. Id. Additionally, agencies were notorious for report-
ing public record information such as arrests or bankruptcies without updating
it to reflect final dispositions. Id Furthermore, agencies did not delete ad-
verse information from a consumer's file after the passage of time. I& Thus,
some consumers were burdened for life by earlier credit difficulties, even after
improving their performance. Id.
35. Fair Credit Reporting: Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on Fi-
nancial Institutions of the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 823]. Consumer reporting
agencies typically bound their subscribers to a code of silence. A typical con-
tract clause provided that "'all reports, whether oral or written, will be kept
strictly confidential; except as required by law, no information from reports
nor your identity as the reporting agency will be revealed to the persons re-
ported on.'" 115 CONG. REC. 2412 (1969) (statement of Senator Proxmire).
36. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 33,409 (1969) (statement of Senator Proxinire
noting that the consumer often does not know she is being damaged by con-
sumer reports because of the collusion between agencies and report users).
37. The legislative hearings on the FCRA are replete with stories of indi-
viduals maligned by false or inaccurate reports. See Hearings on S. 823, supra
note 35, passim. Senator Proxmire, introducing his bill in the Senate, pro-
vided the following examples:
A Pennsylvania woman was turned down for major medical cov-
erage by an insurance company. After repeated interviews with com-
pany officials and the Pennsylvania insurance commissioner, the
woman's husband finally learned the reason. A credit report indi-
cated she was an alcoholic. In actual fact, the woman had never con-
sumed more than a dozen drinks in 20 years of married life....
[A] California man.., was falsely arrested and convicted of a fel-
ony in 1962 on a case of mistaken identity. In 1963 the real criminal
confessed. Despite his innocence, the man has never been able to ob-
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tion of inaccurate or misleading information were wholly inade-
quate to redress the aggrieved consumer's privacy and
reputation interests.38
tain any credit since even though he is a successful real estate bro-
ker....
A Washington attorney was recently denied employment because
his credit report included information about two cases of intoxication
that occurred 20 years ago.
An Oregon businessman, having difficulty obtaining credit, finally
managed to see his credit report. He discovered a false charge of
bankruptcy which had allegedly occurred 16 years ago. The credit bu-
reau refused to make the correction.
115 CONG. REc. 2411-13 (1969); see also J. SHARP, CREDIT REPORTING AND PRI-
VACY 93-100 (1970) (collection of case histories).
Such stories are not surprising considering that agencies imposed quota re-
quirements as high as 14% for the reporting of adverse information. Hearings
on S. 823, supra note 35, at 186-87, 294-95. Agency investigators risked an unfa-
vorable evaluation of their job performance unless they uncovered adverse in-
formation. Id. at 187 & 295.
A recent investigation conducted by the Federal Trade Commission, cul-
minating in a lengthy complaint, indicates that the FCRA has not entirely
eliminated these questionable practices of pressuring agency employees to pro-
duce adverse information. See In re Equifax Inc., 96 F.T.C. 844, 844-53 (1980),
rev'd in par4 678 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1982). The Commission's complaint
charged the largest consumer reporting agency in the United States, Equifax,
with numerous violations of the FCRA, including the use of operating proce-
dures that pressured investigators to produce adverse information, thus creat-
ing an unreasonable risk of inaccuracy and falsification. Id. at 851; see also id.
at 913 (Equifax stressed to its employees that reporting adverse information
was central to the overall success and marketability of the company's serv-
ices.). The administrative law judge found for the FTC apparently on this the-
ory. Id. at 945 (findings 401-405). The Eleventh Circuit, however, set aside this
portion of the decision on the basis that the evidence failed to support the in-
ference that the company's procedures created an unreasonable likelihood of
inaccuracy. Equifax Inc. v. FTC, 678 F.2d 1047, 1053 (11th Cir. 1982).
38. For general discussions of common law remedies, see J. SHARP, supra
note 37, at 25-85; Blair & Maurer, Statute Law and Common Law: The Fair
Credit Reporting Act 49 Mo. L. REv. 289, 297-301 (1984); Ullman, Liability of
Credit Bureaus After the Fair Credit Reporting Act: The Need for Further Re-
form, 17 VILL. L. REV. 44, 44-58 (1971); Note, Credit Investigations and the
Right to Privacy: Quest for a Remedy, 57 GEO. L.J. 509 (1969); Note, Protect-
ing the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1049-61 (1971) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Protecting Subjects].
Before the FCRA, victims of inaccurate, intrusive, or malicious credit re-
porting had to rely primarily on the common law remedy of defamation. To
state a cause of action, the plaintiff was required to show the publication of a
false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SEC.
OND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). The common law, however, accorded credit bu-
reaus a conditional privilege which required plaintiffs to prove excess
publication or actual malice before recovery was permitted. Blair & Maurer,
supra at 298-300; see generally Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile
Agencies.-MacIntosh v. Dun, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 187 (1914). Plaintiffs rarely
overcame this standard, and maligned consumers were most often left without
a remedy. See Note, Protecting Subjects, supra, at 1050-51 (conditional privi-
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To vindicate consumer interests, Congress sought to estab-
lish consumer due process by granting consumers the right to
know of, challenge, and correct inaccurate information dissemi-
nated about them.39 Congress also recognized that widespread
dissemination of consumer information 0 raises legitimate pri-
vacy concerns.41 At the same time, Congress acknowledged
lege, requiring showing of actual malice, precludes recovery because express
intent to harm is rare).
39. Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 2. Senator Proxmire, the bill's
original sponsor, asserted that the goal of his bill was to ensure that the re-
porting system would serve consumers as well as the reporting industry. Id.
Inaccurate, outdated, or misleading information in an individual's credit file
often led to a denial of credit, insurance, or employment. See, e.g., id. at 84-87,
94, 393-98, 402-05, 407-14, 418-24; Fair Credit Reporting: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm on Banking and Cur-
rency on H.R. 16340, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 243-54, 287-89 (1970) [hereinafter
Hearings on H.R. 16340]. The FCRA is designed to decrease the risk of erro-
neous reporting and to afford remedies when the injury incurred is due to neg-
ligent or intentional misconduct.
40. The credit reporting industry, maintaining well over 135 to 150 million
files, issues one or more reports per family every year. Hearings on H.R. 2360,
supra note 30, at 20 (John L. Spafford, President, Associated Credit Bureaus,
Inc., (ACB) testifying that firms belonging to ACB represent approximately
80-90% of the industry and maintain roughly 120 million files).
41. Before enacting the FCRA, Congress held numerous hearings to in-
vestigate the consumer reporting industry and its invasion of consumer pri-
vacy. See generally Hearings on H.R. 16340, supra note 39 (inquiring into the
privacy and due process issues raised by consumer reporting methods and the
necessity and desired form of federal legislation); Hearings on S. 823, supra
note 35 (exploring the need to balance consumers' privacy interests against the
need for consumer reporting and debating the ability of the Fair Credit Re-
porting Bill to accomodate these competing interests); The Credit Industry:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant to S. Res. 233, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968)
(exploring the antitrust implications of the reporting industry's highly concen-
trated nature, its operational methods, and the likely impact of introducing
computer technology into the field); Privacy Hearings, supra note 32
(prompted by the computerization of consumer reporting, the committee ex-
amined the problems of unauthorized access and inaccuracy, and considered
legislation designed to ensure the protection of consumers' privacy); Retail
Credit Co. of Atlanta, Ga.: Hearing Before a Special Subcomm. on Invasion of
Privacy of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1968) (investigating the extent to which the practices of the Retail Credit Co.
infringe citizens' privacy interests). Commentators also raised the privacy is-
sue. See, e.g., Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of
a New Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 1091
(1969) (exploring the implications of computerization and the rise of an infor-
mation-based society for personal privacy, including the threatened loss of con-
trol over access, accuracy, and use of personal data); Miller, Computers, Data
Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, 4 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REV. 1
(1972) (commentary on growth of various data banks in society; their uses and
misuses; the risks that attend computerization, centralization, and unre-
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that creditors, insurers, employers, and others must have avail-
able adequate information to evaluate the risks involved in con-
strained circulation of information; and the need for legislation to preserve
personal privacy).
Routinely reported information often is irrelevant to an individual's insur-
ance, employment, or credit worthiness. Credit reports may cover the sub-
ject's sexual habits and moral background, for example. Hearings on S. 823,
supra note 35, at 56 (statement of Mr. Caemmerer, State Senator, New York).
The legislative hearings on the FCRA revealed that, in particular, the insur-
ance reporting firm's reports generally contain information including
Racial or ethnic descent; drinking habits; reasons for drinking;, domes-
tic trouble; immoral conduct; gambling activities; use of drugs; type or
reputation of associates; general character and reputation; type of
neighborhood; family reputation; housekeeping habits; condition of
yard; number of bathrooms per resident;... reasons for divorce or sep-
aration; care of children; attitude toward authority; quarrelsome be-
havior; abuse of family; argumentative, antagonistic, antisocial or
uncooperative attitudes; and common law marriage.
115 CONG. REc. 33,409-10 (1969); see Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 196-
202, 278-87, 306-12 (sample report forms from Retail Credit Company, Ameri-
can Service Bureau, and O'Hanlon Reports); Note, Fair Credit Reporting Act-
The Case for Revision, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 409, 435-37 (1977) (arguing that
FCRA should be amended to regulate the gathering and reporting of irrele-
vant information). Senator Proxmire reported that industry representatives
admitted that some questions are "silly, unnecessary, and unduly intrusive."
115 CONG. REC. 33,410 (1969). An insurance investigator with 20 years experi-
ence maintained that "credit investigations are frequently characterized by
hearsay evidence, inaccuracies, incompetent investigators, and snide insinua-
tions." Id. at 2411.
Congress intended that consumer confidentiality and privacy be respected
through responsible reporting. The committee report accompanying S. 823
states that the bill was designed to protect consumers from inaccurate and ar-
bitrary reporting and to prevent "undue invasion of the individual's right of
privacy." S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969). Further, Congress ex-
pressly stated in the FCRA, as enacted, that its purpose was to require agen-
cies to "adopt reasonable procedures" to meet market needs for consumer
information that are fair to the consumer "with regard to the confidentiality,
accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(b) (1982). Congress cautioned that agencies must "exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer's
right to privacy." Id § 1681(a)(4).
For cases interpreting the FCRA's purpose, see, e.g., New Palm Gardens,
Inc. v. Bentley, No. 82-1361-MA (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file) (the FCRA was adopted for the purpose of bringing some reg-
ularity to the reporting industry); In re TRW, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 1007, 1009
(D.C. Mich. 1978) ("In passing the F.C.R.A. Congress intended to prevent un-
reasonable or careless invasions of consumer privacy .... ."); Ackerley v. Credit
Bureau, 385 F. Supp. 658, 659 (D.C. Wyo. 1974) (noting that the Act's purpose
"is to protect the reputation of a consumer, for once false rumors are circu-
lated there is not complete vindication"); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children's
Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Act's purpose is to protect indi-
viduals from inaccurate and arbitrary information in a report that is being
used to determine eligibility for credit, insurance, or employment); Rasor v.
Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 520-21, 554 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1976) (FCRA is
1987] 1327
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sumer transactions. 42 Recognizing these competing interests,
the FCRA strikes a balance between the commercial need for
easy access to information and the individual consumer's due
process and privacy interests.43
Generally, the FCRA regulates the collection, dissemina-
tion, and use of consumer reports.4 A consumer report con-
tains information bearing on the consumer's character, general
reputation, or credit standing and is collected or used for a pur-
pose specified within the Act.45 For purposes of imposing addi-
tional requirements,46 the FCRA identifies a special type of
consumer report, referred to as an investigative consumer re-
port."" An investigative consumer report is simply a consumer
report procured through personal interviews with the subject's
neighbors or associates. 48
The Act regulates the activities of two parties, consumer
reporting agencies and users of consumer reports.49 A con-
sumer reporting agency is any person50 who collects or evalu-
ates consumer information to disseminate in consumer reports
Congress's response to documented abuses and is designed to protect a con-
sumer's reputation before damage by false rumors or inaccurate information).
42. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969) (business com-
munity needs to know the facts for sound decision making about consumer
transactions).
43. Congressional members and consumer experts expressed the need to
balance the business community's informational requirements with consum-
ers' right to know of and correct inaccurate information being disseminated
about them. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 36,572 (1970) (statement by Representa-
tive Sullivan, the bill's House sponsor); Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 13
(statement of Virginia H. Knauer, Special Assistant to the President for Con-
sumer Affairs).
44. For the definition of "consumer report" under the Act, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(d) and supra note 20. The obligations imposed by the Act generally
apply if and only if the report in question is a "consumer report" under the
Act. See infra notes 54-60 & 64 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 20.
46. See infra note 57 and note 60 and accompanying text.
47. For the definition of "investigative consumer report," see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(e) and supra note 18.
48. See supra notes 18-20 for a discussion of investigative consumer
reports.
49. See DIVISION OF CREDIT PRACTICES, BUREAu OF CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION, FEDERAL TRADE COiMMussION, COMPLIANCE WITH THE FAIR CREDIT RE-
PORTING ACT, 5 Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) % 11,302, at 59,783 (March 1979)
[hereinafter FTC, COMPLIANCE].
50. The FCRA broadly defines "person" as "any individual, partnership,
corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government, or governmen-
tal subdivision or agency, or other entity." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(b).
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to third parties.51 Users are persons-typically insurers, credi-
tors, or employers-who purchase consumer information from
agencies to use in connection with their transactions with the
report's subject.52
The FCRA primarily regulates consumer reporting agen-
cies.53 It requires that agencies maintain reasonable proce-
duresm to avoid reporting obsolete information 5 and to assure
maximum possible accuracy 5 6 of consumer reports.57 Gener-
51. For the definition of a "consumer reporting agency," see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(f) and supra note 5.
52. See FTC, COMPLIANCE, supra note 49, % 11,306, at 59,820.
53. See Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1220 (9th Cir. 1978) (the Act's
objectives, as embodied in Congress's statement of purpose, are accomplished
principally through the regulation of consumer reporting agencies); D'Angelo
v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1250, 1253 (D. Del. 1981) (the
Act is directed at consumer reporting agencies); Rice v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 670 (M.D.N.C. 1978) ("main bulk of FCRA requirements
are imposed on consumer reporting agencies"). A cursory examination of the
FCRA's structure reveals Congress's principal emphasis. Only two regulatory
provisions apply to consumer report users, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681d, 1681m,
whereas ten provisions regulate the reporting industry, see id. §§ 1681b, 1681c,
1681e, 1681f, 1681g, 1681h, 1681i, 1681j, 1681k, 16811.
54. The Federal Trade Commission advises that reasonable procedures
are those that assure informational integrity and source reliability when infor-
mation is collected and recorded followed by procedures ensuring accurate re-
production in consumer reports. FTC, COMPLIANCE, supra note 49, 11,305, at
59,808. Periodic reevaluations are required to weed out obsolete or misleading
information, and adverse data should be confirmed by additional sources. Id
at 59,808-09. Procedures to preserve the information's appropriate context and
purpose should also be used to avoid misinterpretation when the information
is used in alternative contexts for different purposes. Id- at 59,809.
55. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c.
56. The primary obstacle faced by an aggrieved consumer is a threshold
requirement that the challenged information be clearly inaccurate. See Daily,
The Standard of Care in the Credit Industry, 27 WAsH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 249, 257 (1984). If the report in question is a true and accurate statement of
the facts, judicial assessment of the reasonableness of procedures is foreclosed.
See, e.g., Todd v. Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc., 451 F. Supp. 447, 449
(E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1376 (1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979).
The consumer damaged by an incomplete and misleading, though technically
accurate, consumer report is generally denied relief. See, ag., Roseman v. Re-
tail Credit Co., 428 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (where report accurately
reflected employer's record that plaintiff had resigned because of "discrepan-
cies in his accounts," plaintiff was denied relief despite his protestations that
he had never stated his reason for resigning); Middlebrooks v. Retail Credit
Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (where the fact of arrest was
accurate, plaintiff was denied recovery for a misleading report that failed to
indicate that there was no final disposition of the criminal charge against
plaintiff); see also Daily, supra, at 257-58 (noting that courts uniformly deny
recovery to plaintiffs suing consumer reporting agencies for technically accu-
rate but misleading or damaging consumer reports). But see Koropoulos v.
Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Congress mandated the
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ally, the Act prohibits agencies from disseminating consumer
reports for any purpose other than for use in connection with a
credit, employment, insurance, licensing, or other business
transaction with the report's subject.58
The Act places fewer strictures on users of consumer re-
ports. When a user takes adverse action based on an agency's
consumer report, it must notify the consumer that adverse ac-
tion has been taken and disclose the source of the report.5 9 Ad-
ditionally, the statute requires an investigative consumer report
user to notify the consumer within three days of its request for
the report, disclosing clearly and accurately the type of infor-
mation that may be collected, and the consumer's right to ob-
tain additional disclosures.60
The FCRA also creates significant new rights and remedies
for consumers. Upon request and proper identification, the
standard of "maximum possible accuracy" and technically accurate but mis-
leading information is "neither maximally accurate nor fair to the consumer").
Even if the consumer meets the threshold inaccuracy requirement, how-
ever, the agency is not liable if its procedures were reasonable. Hauser v.
Equifax, Inc., 602 F.2d 811, 814-815 (8th Cir. 1979). In assessing the reasonable-
ness of the agency's procedures, the jury must decide "what a reasonably pru-
dent person would do under the circumstances." Thompson v. San Antonio
Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1982); Bryant v. TRW, Inc.,
689 F.2d 72, 78 (6th Cir. 1982); see generally Comment, The Functions of Con-
sumer Reporting Agencies Under the Fair Credit Reporting Ack" Bryant v.
TRW, Inc, 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982), 59 WASH. L. REV. 401, 407-16 (1984) (an-
alyzing appropriate content of "reasonable procedures" under the FCRA in
light of Bryant).
57. Another FCRA provision prohibits agencies from reusing adverse in-
formation in an investigative consumer report without reverification. 15
U.S.C. § 16811. Agencies also must use strict procedures to ensure that any
public record information likely to affect adversely the consumer's ability to
obtain employment is complete and up to date and must notify the consumer
at the time the information is transmitted in a consumer report to a user. 15
U.S.C. § 1681k.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3). Agencies may disseminate consumer reports for
other purposes if required by court order, id, § 1681b(1), or if given written au-
thorization by the consumer, id, § 1681b(2).
59. Id. § 1681m(a). Adverse action includes denial of insurance, credit, or
employment, or increased charges for insurance or credit. Id.
60. Id. § 1681d(a)(1). The burden of notifying the individual that a re-
quest for an investigative consumer report was made falls solely on the re-
questing party and an agency has no duty or potential liability under this
section. Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 10 (D. Minn. 1976).
Under § 1681d(a), no duty of notification attaches unless the report is both
a "consumer report" as defined by § 1681a(d), see supra note 20, and involves
an investigation including personal interviews as required by § 1681a(e), see
supra note 18.
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agency must disclose 6 ' the nature and substance of virtually all
information in the consumer's file.62 If the consumer disputes
the accuracy of any information on file, the agency must
reinvestigate.6 3 If the dispute persists after reinvestigation, the
consumer may submit a personal statement that accompanies
any subsequent consumer report containing the disputed infor-
mation.64 Most important, the FCRA grants consumers an ex-
press private cause of action against agencies or users for
negligent 65 or willful 66 noncompliance with any of the FCRA's
61. For the conditions under which a consumer reporting agency must
make disclosures to consumers, see 15 U.S.C. § 1681h.
62. Id. Section 1681g requires the agency to disclose the "nature and sub-
stance" of all information, except medical information, in an individual's file.
The disclosure requirement is not limited to information constituting a con-
sumer report. See H. REP. No. 1587, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4411, 4415 (intent is to allow the con-
sumer to examine all filed information excluding sources for investigative in-
formation). The House and Senate conferees explicitly stated that a consumer
may "examine all the information in his file," although § 1681a(g)'s language
precludes the physical handling of the file itself. Id
Under some circumstances, the agency must disclose the sources of infor-
mation and recent consumer report recipients. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2)
(consumer has right to disclosure of all of file's informational sources, except
when those sources have been used solely for preparing an investigative con-
sumer report); id. § 1681g(a)(3)(A), (B) (disclosure of recipients required if the
consumer report was furnished for employment purposes within two years
preceding the request or for any other purpose within six months preceding
the request).
63. Id. § 1681i(a). See FTC, COMPLIANCE, supra note 49, % 11,305, at 59,814-
15 (at a minimum, the agency must recheck the original sources but, prefera-
bly, should also contact additional sources). If upon reinvestigation the infor-
mation is found to be inaccurate or cannot be verified, it must be deleted. 15
U.S.C. § 1681i(a).
An exception to required reinvestigation arises when the agency has a rea-
sonable belief that the request is frivolous. Id The FTC guidelines, however,
assert that the agency should presume "that the consumer's complaint is bona
fide" absent "clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." FTC, COMPLI-
ANCE, supra note 49, f] 11,305, at 59,814.
64. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(b), (c) (consumer reporting agency must "clearly
note" that the consumer disputes the information and must also furnish the
consumer's statement or a "clear and accurate" summary of the statement).
65. Id § 1681o; see generally Note, Panacea or Placebo? Actions for Negli-
gent Noncompliance Under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1070, 1096-1124 (1974) (analyzing the impact and shortcomings of the
FCRA's negligent noncompliance remedy). Recoverable damages may include
humiliation, mental distress, and all other types of compensatory awards. See,
e.g., Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.
1982) (upholding $10,000 award for humiliation and mental distress).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. See, e.g., Carroll v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 434 F. Supp.
557, 560-61 (E.D. La. 1977) (user willfully violated the Act by neglecting to in-
form the credit applicant of the agency's name after denial of credit); Collins




Because a consumer's right to enforce the FCRA's protec-
tions depends on finding a consumer report,68 Congress focused
considerable attention on the Act's consumer report definition,
changing it drastically between the bill's initial introduction in
the Senate and its final enactment.69 Senator Proxmire's origi-
lation by agency for reporting false accusations of excessive drinking habits
and low moral character and refusing to reinvestigate); Millstone v. O'Hanlon
Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 274-75 (E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th
Cir. 1976) (holding that the company's repeated refusals to disclose the report,
its knowing inclusion of false information, and its abhorent procedures consti-
tuted a willful violation of the FCRA).
67. In addition to civil liability, a user may be held criminally liable for
obtaining any information from a consumer reporting agency under false pre-
tenses. 15 U.S.C. § 1681q.
68. Individuals are granted some rights that are independent of whether
the information constitutes a consumer report under the Act. See supra notes
61-63 and accompanying text.
69. When Senator Proxmire first proposed his credit reporting bill to the
Senate in 1968, the scope provision provided:
The term 'credit report' means any written or oral report, recommen-
dation, or representation as to the credit worthiness, standing, or ca-
pacity of any individual, and includes any information which is sought
or given for the purpose of serving as the basis for a judgment as to
any of the foregoing factors.
114 CONG. REc. 24,904 (1968). When the bill was reintroduced in 1969, Senator
Proxmire had modified the definitional provision. See S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 2415 (1969). The new definition appeared in two parts.
"Credit report" was defined as a "communication of any credit rating, or of
any information which is sought or given for the purpose of serving as a basis
for a credit rating." Id § 163(c). The bill's definition of "credit rating" ex-
panded the regulated information to include not only credit information but
also information on the subject's character or general reputation. I& § 163(b).
The 1969 bill's structure also had been altered. The bill contained a new
permissible dissemination provision which served as the forerunner to the cur-
rent Act's § 1681b (restricting consumer reporting agencies' lawful right to dis-
seminate consumer reports). It stated a two-part requirement. Reporting
agencies could furnish the information they collected only "(1) to persons with
a legitimate business need for the information and who [intended] to use the
information in connection with a prospective consumer credit or other transac-
tion with the individual on whom the information [was] furnished; and (2) for
the purposes disclosed in the collection of the information." S. 823, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. § 164(f)(1), (2), 115 CONG. REc. 2415 (1969). The provision governing
the credit report definition, which dictated the bill's intended scope, was en-
tirely independent of the new provision restricting permissible dissemination
of credit reports.
The 1969 bill was then reported to the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency, which vigorously debated the bill's language throughout five days of
hearings. See Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, passim The committee fun-
damentally changed the bill's definitions, which had the effect of broadening
its scope. The regulated reports, identified in the 1969 bill as "credit reports,"
were renamed "consumer reports" to reflect Congress's intent that the Act
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nal bill, containing relatively simple definitions,70 met with vig-
orous debate during the legislative hearings,71 and the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency and the reporting indus-
try made numerous compromises before a consensus was
reached.7 2 When finally reported out of committee, the con-
sumer report definition had been substantially revised; it was
both more complex and significantly broader than the original
definition.7"
As enacted, FCRA section 1681a(d) defines "consumer re-
port" as any information communicated by a consumer report-
ing agency74 bearing on a consumer's75  credit capacity,
character, or general reputation "which is used or expected to
be used or collected in whole or in part" for a statutory pur-
pose.76 The statutory purposes enumerated in section 1681a(d)
include establishing eligibility for credit, insurance, or employ-
ment, and "other purposes authorized under section 1681b. ' '77
regulate more than credit reports. The substance of the consumer report defi-
nition also was changed. The 1969 bill essentially covered credit and general
character and reputation information used in connection with a consumer
transaction for the purpose of serving as the basis of a credit rating. As re-
ported out of committee in 1970 and as finally enacted, the bill covered credit
and general character and reputation information "used or expected to be used
or collected" for insurance, credit, employment, or licensing purposes, or used
in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(d) (emphasis added); see supra note 20. Thus, the definition had been
broadened to cover information not only used, but also expected to be used or
collected for statutory purposes. Moreover, the statutory purposes had been
expanded significantly beyond the original credit rating purpose to encompass
numerous consumer transactions. Congress not only augmented the purposes
enumerated in the Act's definitional section but incorporated § 1681b's pur-
poses as well.
The evolution of the statutory language during the enactment process is
an important guide in ascertaining the purpose and intended effect of the bill
as passed. See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCMION § 48.04, at 300-05 (C. Sands rev. 4th ed. 1984) (describing use of the
enactment process in statutory construction). The evolution of the FCRA's
statutory language, when analyzed in light of the underlying reasons for the
changes, is crucial to FCRA interpretation. See infra notes 150, 156, 190 & 207
and accompanying text (discussing the reasons that underlie the "used or col-
lected" language, the incorporation provision, and the current permissible dis-
semination provision).
70. See supra note 69.
71. See Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, passim.
72. See infra notes 154-57 & 189-91 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 69.
74. See supra note 5 for the definition of consumer reporting agency.
75. For the Act's definition of "consumer," see supra note 16.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (emphasis added); see supra note 20.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (emphasis added); see supra note 20.
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The supplemental purposes listed in section 1681b 78 include use
of information "in connection with a business transaction in-
volving the consumer."79 Section 1681b, however, is not a defi-
nitional section; it is a substantive section that limits a
consumer reporting agency's lawful right to disseminate con-
sumer reports.8 0
The consumer report definition's incorporation of a sub-
78. Section 1681b provides in relevant part:
A consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report
under the following circumstances and no other:
(3) To a person which it has reason to believe-
(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit
transaction involving the consumer... and involving the extension of
credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the consumer; or
(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the un-
derwriting of insurance involving the consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determi-
nation of the consumer's eligibility for a license or other benefit
granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to con-
sider an applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
(E) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information
in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer.
15 U.S.C. § 1681b. Section 1681b's enforcing provision, § 1681e(a), requires
agencies to employ "reasonable procedures" to ensure against unauthorized
disclosures of consumer reports. See id § 1681e(a).
79. I& § 1681b(3)(E) (emphasis added).
80. According to the FCRA's legislative history, § 1681b was included in
the Act to protect the consumer's interest in file confidentiality and personal
privacy by restricting the ability of agencies to disseminate reports. See 115
CONG. REc. 33,409-10 (1969) (statement of Senator Proxmire reporting the bill
to the Senate floor); id at 2415 (1969); 116 CONG. REc. 35,941 (1970). The hear-
ings on the bill confirmed that agencies were indiscriminately distributing
highly sensitive information in response to random letters or phone calls,
without identifying the requesting party or its intended use. 115 CONG. REC.
33,412 (1969) (statement of Congressman Williams). Under the FCRA, the
agency may not release a consumer report unless a legitimate transaction be-
tween the requesting party and the report's subject is imminent. Heath v.
Credit Bureau, 618 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1980).
The Act requires compliance with the permissible dissemination provision,
§ 1681b, through § 1681e(a). Section 1681e(a) requires agencies to adopt rea-
sonable procedures to ensure that prospective users of consumer reports iden-
tify themselves and certify that the information requested will be used only
for a statutorily permitted purpose. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a); see Middlebrooks v.
Retail Credit Co., 416 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (once the informa-
tion's relevancy and a permissible purpose are established, judicial inquiry is at
an end). The Federal Trade Commission advises that reasonable procedures
include using written subscriber agreements that bind consumer report users
to comply with the FCRA's restrictions on permissible uses and enforcing
stringently identification procedures to avoid unauthorized access through a
reporting agency account. See FTC, COMPLIANCE, supra note 49, 11,305, at
59,807-08. If the agency releases a consumer report absent a permissible pur-
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stantive section complicates FCRA interpretation. The FCRA's
scope depends first on the interpretation of the "used or col-
lected" language, and second on the extent to which section
1681a(d)'s incorporation provision includes section 1681b's pro-
visions-in particular, its business transaction provision.8 '
Courts have followed two distinct approaches for determining
whether a report is a consumer report in light of the "used or
collected" language. These approaches can be characterized as
an actual use test and a collection purpose test. Courts apply-
ing the actual use test examine whether the information com-
municated is in fact used for a statutory purpose.82 This test
pose under § 1681b, it may be civilly liable for negligent or willful violation of
the Act. See Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 523 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
81. Case law interpreting § 1681a(d)'s incorporation of § 1681b has focused
on the extent to which information used "in connection with a business trans-
action involving the consumer," § 1681b(3)(E), expands the consumer report
definition in § 1681a(d), and what activities are "business transactions" for pur-
poses of the consumer report definition. See New Palm Gardens, Inc., v. Bent-
ley, No. 82-1361-MA (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) (report used in connection with a government investigation of defendant's
nightclub not a consumer report because the investigation was not a business
transaction between the officials and the defendant); Cochran v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (an insurance claim re-
port is not a consumer report because evaluating an insured's disability claim
is not a business transaction between the insured and insurer); Horton v. Pin-
kerton's Inc., No. H-75-C-17, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 19, 1976) (a report
used in connection with judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is not a consumer
report because such proceedings are not a business transaction between the
parties); Ley v. Boron Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240, 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (report
used to investigate letter writer's identity is not a consumer report because a
threatened lawsuit is not a business transaction between parties); Daniels v.
Retail Credit Co., No. 73-CV-484 (N.D.N.Y. April 28, 1976) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Dist file) (a report used in connection with litigation arising from a con-
tractual dispute is not a consumer report because litigation does not constitute
a business transaction between parties); Greenway v. Informational Dynamics,
Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974) (a report used in connection with
the purchase of goods or services is a consumer report because such transac-
tions constitute business transactions between the parties), affd, 524 F.2d 1145
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976); Beresh v. Retail Credit Co.,
358 F. Supp. 260, 261-62 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (an insurance claim report is a con-
sumer report because evaluating a disability claim is a business transaction be-
tween the insurer and the insured); Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F.
Supp. 652, 654-55 (E.D. La. 1972) (report used to evaluate an applicant's eligi-
bility for business insurance is not a consumer report because purchase of an
insurance policy for business use is not a business transaction between the
buyer and the seller as contemplated by the Act).
82. See Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144, 1148 (3d Cir.
1986); Matthews v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 741 F.2d 217, 219 (8th Cir.
1984); D'Angelo v. Wilmington Medical Center, 515 F. Supp. 1250, 1254 (D. Del.
1981); Cochran, 472 F. Supp. at 830-31; Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 8 (D.
Minn. 1976); Horton v. Pinkerton's, Inc., No. H-75-C-17, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Ark.
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generally relies on Congress's express intention to include or to
exclude specific uses of reports from the FCRA's purview.8 3
Taking a broader approach, courts that apply the collection
purpose test look to the reporting agency's original purpose for
collecting the information.8 4 If the original collection purpose
was within the FCRA's scope, this test classifies subsequent
communication of the information as a consumer report, re-
gardless of the information's actual use.85 The collection pur-
pose test relies on the Act's plain language8 6 and structure.8 7
Nov. 19, 1976); Ley, 419 F. Supp. at 1242; Gardner v. Investigators, Inc., 413 F.
Supp. 780, 781 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Daniels v. Retail Credit Co., No. 73-CV-484
(N.D.N.Y. April 28, 1976); Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252,
254 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Fernandez, 349 F. Supp. at 654; Kiblen v. Pickle, 33 Wash.
App. 387, 392, 395, 653 P.2d 1339, 1341, 1342 (1982); McKeel v. Retail Credit Co.,
No. 53130, slip op. at 5 (4th D. Idaho, March 10, 1975). See, e.g., Note, The Fair
Credit Reporting Act: Are Business Credit Reports Regulated 1971 DuKE L.J.
1229, 1245-46 (informational item can attain consumer report status through its
use for a consumer purpose).
83. For example, courts generally exclude reports used for business pur-
poses without regard to whether the report contains information originally
collected for statutory purposes, because Congress expressly intended to ex-
clude commercial reporting from the Act's purview. See infra note 89 and ac-
companying text.
84. See Heath, 618 F.2d at 696; Ippolito v. WNS, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 471, 473
(N.D. Ill. 1986); Russell v. Shelter Fin. Servs., 604 F. Supp. 201, 202 (W.D. Mo.
1984); Boothe, 523 F. Supp. at 634; Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F.
Supp. 668, 671-72 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356
(D. Ariz. 1975); Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 522-23, 554 P.2d
1041, 1046 (1976). See e.g., Note, supra note 82, at 1246 (the "or collected" lan-
guage focuses on the agency's intent at the time the information is gathered).
85. Boothe, 523 F. Supp. at 634; see also Heath, 618 F.2d at 696 (information
originally collected for statutory purposes is automatically a consumer report
when transmitted); Rasor, 87 Wash. 2d at 523, 554 P.2d at 1046 (once informa-
tion is collected for a statutory purpose, it is a consumer report under the Act,
and its character is not changed by its subsequent use for a nonstatutory pur-
pose).
The Federal Trade Commission, charged with enforcement of the FCRA,
see 15 U.S.C. § 1681s, concurs in this interpretation of the Act. The Commis-
sion states that
[a] reporting agency or requesting party cannot contend that the law
does not apply because the report will be used for some purpose other
than credit, insurance or employment and, therefore, it is not a "con-
sumer report". The law applies because the information was collected
by the agency for one or more of the permissible purposes ....
FTC, COMPLiANCE, supra note 49, 11,305, at 59,807.
86. See Heath, 618 F.2d at 696 (the "used or collected" language is critical
in FCRA analysis and must be given effect to avoid improperly limiting the
Act's scope and undermining Congress's intention to protect consumers' pri-
vacy); Ippolito, 636 F. Supp. at 473 (the consumer report definition's language
requires inquiry into the agency's collection motives); Houghton, 615 F. Supp.
at 304 n.9 (the FCRA's legislative history provides no persuasive reason for de-
viating from the Act's plain language, which requires inquiry into the agency's
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Courts often interpret the "used or collected" language in
suits involving a report that contains information about the in-
dividual consumer but was obtained for business, as opposed to
consumer, purposes.88 In this context, most courts have applied
the actual use test, relying on Congress's intention to exclude
commercial reporting from the FCRA's scope,8 9 leaving the re-
port unregulated and the consumer unprotected.9 0 Several
courts, however, have adopted the collection purpose test in the
business report context, giving full effect to the Act's plain lan-
original collection purpose); Rice, 450 F. Supp. at 672 (restricting the FCRA's
scope by focusing only on the report's actual use is contrary to the Act's plain
language and undermines consumer protection); Rasor, 87 Wash. 2d at 522, 554
P.2d at 1046 (the "used or collected" language, expressing Congress's intent re-
garding the Act's scope, should be given its ordinary meaning).
87. See infra notes 129-33 & 159-62 and accompanying text.
88. See Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252, 253-54 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (a credit report concerning business's principal used in connection
with the company's lease application was not a consumer report regulated by
the Act because the report was used to establish eligibility for commercial
rather than consumer credit); Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652,
654-55 (E.D. La. 1972) (report on corporation's president used in connection
with the corporation's application for key man insurance was not a consumer
report because it was not used to determine eligibility for insurance for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes).
Agencies collecting and providing information exclusively for use in con-
nection with a consumer's transactions in his or her business capacity are not
regulated by the Act, regardless of whether their reports contain information
on the individual consumer. See, e.g., Wrigley v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 969, 970-71 (N.D. Ga.) (personal credit reports issued by Dun & Brad-
street to users contractually bound to use the reports in connection with only
commercial transactions are not covered by the FCRA), affd, 500 F.2d 1183
(5th Cir. 1974).
89. The FCRA's scope is clearly limited to consumer reporting and was
not intended to cover reports "utilized for business, commercial, or profes-
sional purposes." 116 CoNG. REc. 36,572 (1970); see also S. REP. No. 517, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969) ("[T]he bill does not cover business credit reports or
business insurance reports."); Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 16-17 (the
bill does not cover reports on businesses). This limitation is further mani-
fested in the Act itself, which defines "consumer" as an individual. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681a(c).
90. See Matthews v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 741 F.2d 217, 219 (8th
Cir. 1984) (a credit report used solely to evaluate applicant's financial capacity
for a commercial lease is exempt from FCRA coverage); Wigley, 375 F. Supp.
at 971 (report containing information on the plaintiff's personal finances used
in connection with his construction company's application for commercial
credit is not a consumer report regulated by the FCRA); Sizemore, 360 F.
Supp. at 254 (personal credit report issued on business's owner used to evalu-
ate the business's lease application is not a consumer report for purposes of
the FCRA); Fernande4 349 F. Supp. at 654-55 (personal credit report obtained
on company's president used to evaluate the company's application for insur-
ance is not a consumer report within the Act's scope).
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guage and bringing such reports within the FCRA's scope. 91
Courts have followed both the narrow92 and the broad93 con-
struction of the "used or collected" language in other contexts
as well.
Courts also differ regarding the extent to which section
1681b's business transaction provision, included in the con-
suimer report definition through the incorporation provision,94
expands the FCRA's transactional scope.95 Most courts have
read the business transaction provision narrowly when the re-
91. See Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 523 F. Supp. 631, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(a credit report on the principal of a business obtained by another company to
investigate a suspected fraud must be analyzed with reference to the agency's
original collection purpose); Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516, 522,
554 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1976) (information originally collected for consumer's in-
surance application subsequently used in connection with her business's credit
application is a consumer report within the Act).
92. See Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 8-10 (D. Minn. 1976) (report cov-
ering financial status and personal background used for political purposes is
not a consumer report); Horton v. Pinkerton's, Inc., No. H-75-C-17, slip op. at 7
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 19, 1976) (report used to defend employer in workman's com-
pensation hearing is not a consumer report embraced by the Act); Ley v. Bo-
ron Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240, 1242 (W.D. Pa 1976) (credit report used to
investigate letter writer's identity is not a consumer report); Gardner v. Inves-
tigators, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 780, 781 (M.D. Fla. 1976) (report used in connection
with child support litigation is not a consumer report regulated by the FCRA).
93. Heath v. Credit Bureau, 618 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1980) (a report cover-
ing bankruptcy information allegedly used by plaintiffs union to humiliate
and discredit him must be analyzed with reference to the agency's original col-
lection purpose); Ippolito v. WNS, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 471, 473 (N.D. IIl. 1986) (a
report containing financial and personal information used in connection with a
declaratory judgment action is a consumer report because the information was
presumptively collected for a statutory purpose and the agency expected use
consistent with the Act); Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359 (D.
Ariz. 1975) (a report obtained by a law firm from a consumer reporting agency
allegedly used to discredit the plaintiff was a consumer report because it could
be used for a statutory purpose).
94. See 15 U.S.C. 1681a(d)(3).
95. For cases holding that § 1681b's business transaction provision, as in-
corporated, does not expand the consumer report definition beyond the con-
tours of § 1681a(d), see Cochran v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 827,
831 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D.
La. 1972); Kiblen v. Pickle, 33 Wash. App. 387, 395, 653 P.2d 1338, 1342 (1982);
McKeel v. Retail Credit Co., Civil No. 53130, slip op. at 5 (4th D. Idaho March
10, 1975).
For cases holding that § 1681b's business transaction provision, as incorpo-
rated, does expand the consumer report definition beyond the contours of
§ 1681a(d), see Belshaw, 392 F. Supp. at 1359-60; Greenway v. Information Dy-
namics, Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (D. Ariz. 1974), affd, 524 F.2d 1145 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert dismissed, 424 U.S. 936 (1976); Beresh v. Retail Credit Co., 358
F. Supp. 260, 262 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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port litigated is an insurance claim report,96 business credit re-
port, or business insurance report,97 because these types of
reports raise conflicts between section 1681a(d)'s consumer re-
port definition and the incorporated section.98  Section
1681a(d)'s consumer report definition provides that credit and
insurance reports fall under the Act only when collected or
used in connection with credit or insurance "to be used primar-
ily for personal, family, or household purposes." 99  Section
1681a(d) further provides that only insurance reports collected
96. Courts have uniformly held that third party insurance claim reports
obtained in connection with defense of litigation fall outside the parameters of
the consumer report definition. See Horton v. Pinkerton's Inc., No. H-75-C-17
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 19, 1976); Daniels v. Retail Credit Co., No. 73-CV-484
(N.D.N.Y. April 28, 1976) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); McKeel v. Retail
Credit Co., Civil No. 53130, slip op. at 5 (4th D. Idaho March 10, 1975).
Courts have split regarding whether first party insurance claim reports,
obtained to evaluate an insured's claim for benefits under an existing policy,
are encompassed by the business transaction provision. The weight of author-
ity, however, finds that the report is not a consumer report within the FCRA's
scope. See, e.g., Cochran, 472 F. Supp. at 831 (because the business transaction
provision, as incorporated, conforms to the contours of § 1681a(d)'s consumer
report definition, claim reports are excluded from the FCRA's scope); Kiblen,
33 Wash. App. at 395, 653 P.2d at 1342 (section 1681a(d)'s consumer report defi-
nition limits insurance reports to those used to evaluate an applicant's eligibil-
ity for insurance, and the business transaction provision cannot expand the
consumer report definition to encompass reports used to evaluate claims). But
see Beresh v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 260 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (section
1681a(d)'s consumer report definition is expanded by the business transaction
provision to cover a claim report used to evaluate an insured's claim for bene-
fits under an existing policy).
97. See, e.g., Fernandez, 349 F. Supp. at 654 (section 1681a(d)'s consumer
report definition is primary and, therefore, the business transaction provision
does not bring a report used to determine eligibility for business insurance,
rather than insurance for personal or household uses, within the consumer re-
port definition).
98. For example, in Cochran, 472 F. Supp. at 831, the court held that a dis-
ability claim report was not a consumer report under the FCRA. The court
discerned from § 1681a(d)'s consumer report definition that Congress intended
to limit the Act's coverage of insurance reports to those prepared for deter-
mining eligibility for coverage or fitness for underwriting. Id. at 830-31. Com-
plete incorporation of § 1681b's business transaction provision into the
consumer report definition, however, would emasculate these limitations. Id.
The court held that the apparent conflict between §§ 1681a(d) and 1681b is re-
solved by "recognizing the preeminence of § 1681a and then conforming the
breadth of § 1681b to the former's bounds." Id. at 831. In the Cochran court's
view, § 1681b does not expand the consumer report definition beyond the
bounds of § 1681a(d), and a claim for disability benefits does not constitute a
business transaction between the insurer and the insured under the statute.
Id. at 831. See also Note, Judicial Construction of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. Scope and Civil Liability, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 471 (1976) (arguing that
§ 1681b only supplements the consumer report definition).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).
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or used to determine an applicant's "eligibility" for insurance' 00
are within the FCRA's scope.10 ' Unlimited incorporation of
section 1681b's business transaction provision would render
these restrictions meaningless. 102 Several courts, however,
have concluded that Congress intended to extend the Act's
transactional scope beyond section 1681a(d) and have incorpo-
rated completely section 1681b's business transaction provision,
thus construing the consumer report definition broadly.103
100. Section 1681a(d)'s consumer report definition, as supplemented by§ 1681b, also encompasses insurance reports used for determining a consumer's
fitness for underwriting. See id, § 1681b(3)(C); infra note 119.
101. See id. § 1681a(d). Although the "eligibility" language of § 1681a(d)
modifies the credit purpose in addition to the insurance purpose, this limita-
tion on the consumer report definition's coverage of credit reports is removed
through the incorporation of § 1681b's credit provision. See id. § 1681b(3)(A).
Reading §§ 1681a(d) and 1681b together, the FCRA covers reports used or col-
lected for determining an applicant's eligibility for credit, or used in reviewing
or collecting on the report subject's existing credit account. See §§ 1681a(d)(1),
1681b(3)(A).
102. See Cochran, 472 F. Supp. at 830-31 (if the business transaction provi-
sion is read at its broadest, it encompasses all reports and the enumeration of
covered reports in § 1681a(d) would be meaningless). Although § 1681a(d)'s
language is not restrictive on its face, it should be read restrictively. See FTC,
COMPLIANCE, supra note 49, % 11,305, at 59,803 ("primarily for personal, family,
or household purposes" language "serves as a limiting factor" in delineating
the Act's scope regarding credit and insurance reports); infra note 119 (case
law and Federal Trade Commission interpretations support interpreting "eligi-
bility" language as a restriction on the Act's scope regarding insurance
reports).
103. See, e.g., Greenway v. Information Dynamics, Ltd, 524 F.2d 1145 (9th
Cir. 1976), affg 399 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Ariz. 1974), cert dismissed, 424 U.S. 936(1976). In Greenway, the Ninth Circuit held that lists of consumers' check
cashing histories were consumer reports under the FCRA. Id. at 1146. The
only purpose arguably applicable to the lists, aside from the business transac-
tion provision, was the "eligibility for credit" purpose. See supra note 20.
Checks, however, are "tantamount to cash." Greenway, 524 F.2d at 1146(Wright, J., dissenting). The lists disseminated by IDL, therefore, did not fac-
tor into a decision of whether to extend credit, but rather were used only to
decide whether to transact business with the consumer. Greenway, 524 F.2d at
1146; Greenway, 399 F. Supp. at 1095. The court thus relied solely on the busi-
ness transaction provision to expand the consumer report definition beyond §
1681a(d)'s contours. See also Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356,
1359-60 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that § 1681a(d) is not the sole determinant of
the Act's scope, rather it is expanded by § 1681b); Beresh v. Retail Credit Co.,
358 F. Supp. 260 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (holding that the business transaction provi-
sion extends the Act's scope beyond the contours of § 1681a(d)).
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II. HOUGHTON'S RESOLUTION OF THE
DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA
A. THE CouRT's ANALYSIS
In Houghton v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance
Co.,' 0 4 the Third Circuit announced a narrow interpretation of
the FCRA's scope that favors the reporting industry at the ex-
pense of consumers. The court first analyzed whether the in-
surance company had actually used the Equifax report for a
purpose enumerated in the consumer report definition that
would bring it within the FCRA's scope. Although omitting a
direct reference to the "used or collected" language, 05 the
court noted that the insurance company requested the report to
ascertain the validity of Houghton's personal injury claim, not
to evaluate her eligibility for credit, insurance, or employ-
ment.0 6 In the court's view, the insurance company had not
requested the report for a purpose encompassed by section
1681a(d)'s consumer report definition 10 7 and, therefore, had not
requested an investigative consumer report.08 The court thus
implicitly held that the report's actual use was the appropriate
focus in defining a consumer report.10 9 Because under the
court's narrow construction of the "used or collected" language
no consumer report was involved, the FCRA did not apply and
the insurance company was not liable for failing to comply with
the Act's notice provisions.1 0
The Third Circuit next employed a past actual use analysis
to decide whether the insurance company, after having received
the Equifax report, could be liable for failing to disclose the re-
104. 795 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir. 1986), revg 615 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
105. The absence of a direct reference to the "used or collected" language
enabled the court to focus solely on the insurance company's actual use of the
report without having to expound its reason for ignoring the plain language of
the FCRA. Without explaining why the district court's focus on the collection
purpose language was incorrect, the appellate court simply asserted that "[o]ur
examination of the statute leads to a different interpretation." Id at 1148.
106. Id.
107. Id-
108. It was undisputed that Equifax had investigated Houghton within the
meaning of the investigative consumer report definition. See supra note 21.
The determinative issue, therefore, was whether the report was a consumer
report within the Act.
109. Houghton, 795 F.2d at 1148.
110. Id The notice provisions require investigative consumer report users
to notify the consumer of the request and disclose the type of information that
may be collected. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a); supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
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port's contents in response to Houghton's requests., The
Third Circuit rejected the district court's position that
Equifax's search of existing credit files to prepare the report
satisfied the consumer report definition.1 12 The court indicated
that if the existing credit information actually had been used in
the past for a statutory purpose, its reuse in the Equifax report
would constitute a consumer report, provided that the insur-
ance company had notice.1 1 3 Because Equifax's report failed to
indicate whether the existing credit information previously had
been used to establish Houghton's eligibility for credit, insur-
ance, or employment,114 the court concluded that the report
was not an investigative consumer report on its face.1 1 5 With-
out notice, the insurance company was not legally obligated to
comply with the Act's disclosure provisions.11 6
Alternatively, the Third Circuit in Houghton analyzed
whether the insurance company's actual use of the report fell
within the business transaction provision as incorporated into
the consumer report definition. In construing the interrelation-
111. Houghton, 795 F.2d at 1148-49.
112. Id. at 1149. For the district court's discussion of the issue, see Hough-
ton, 615 F. Supp. at 303.
113. Houghton, 795 F.2d at 1149. This Comment advocates adopting the
collection purpose test for consumer report users only where the user knew or
had reason to know of the agency's purpose for collecting the report's informa-
tion. See infra notes 163-77 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit's view,
focusing on the information's past actual use combined with notice to the user
of the past use, is overly stringent and should be rejected. The court would
exclude from the consumer report definition information previously collected
and filed for statutory purposes but never used for those purposes before the
current request. Moreover, the court's standard for adequate notice is so lim-
ited it would enable consumer report users in many instances to circumvent
compliance with the FCRA entirely. In practical terms, the court's standard is
that the user is adequately notified only when the agency expressly tells the
user the report is a consumer report or chronicles the past actual use of the
report's information on the face of the report. A user would, therefore, have
no obligation to comply with the Act, despite subjective knowledge that a con-
sumer report had been received, unless the agency took some affirmative ac-
tion to put the user on notice. This Comment rejects this limited standard,
substituting one that comports with business customs and common agency pro-
cedures. See infra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
114. 795 F.2d at 1149.
115. The Third Circuit held that the phrase "available credit files" failed to
give the report sufficient detail to alert the insurance company that a con-
sumer report had in fact been received. Id,
116. Id. The court left open the issue whether a user would be required
under § 1681d(b) to disclose in response to a consumer's request when the user
had not requested an investigative consumer report from the agency, but had
in fact received a report clearly within the statutory definition of an investiga-
tive consumer report. Id.
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ship of sections 1681a(d) and 1681b"17 the court refused to use
section 1681b's business transaction provision to broaden the
consumer report definition beyond section 1681a(d)'s con-
tours.118 The court reasoned that complete incorporation of the
business transaction provision would nullify the specificity of
sections 1681a(d) and 1681b.'1 9 Instead, the Third Circuit held
117. Id at 1149-50.
118. Id at 1149.
119. Id Section 1681a(d), as supplemented by § 1681b, appears to limit the
Act's scope to insurance reports collected or used to evaluate eligibility for in-
surance or fitness for underwriting. Id- at 1149-50. Using the business transac-
tion provision to extend the Act's coverage to insurance claim reports presents
a conflict, which the Third Circuit resolved in favor of § 1681a(d). Id at 1150.
Arguably, first party insurance claim reports, used to evaluate an in-
sured's claim for benefits under an existing policy, do fall within the FCRA's
scope. The incorporated business transaction provision could cover such claim
reports because they are used in the context of a consumer relationship in a
transaction similar in substance to the Act's other statutory transactions. See
infra note 204 and accompanying text. According to this argument, incorpora-
tion does not present a conflict with § 1681a(d)'s provisions regarding insur-
ance reports because Congress apparently did not intend the provisions to be
definitive and to restrict the Act's scope. Indeed, the FCRA's legislative his-
tory suggests that Congress did not detail the insurance purposes-eligibility
for coverage and fitness for underwriting-in an attempt to restrict the Act's
scope. Rather, Congress ostensibly sought to write a clear, self-enforcing law,
see infra note 190, and to allay confusion surrounding the Act's scope by clari-
fying its expansiveness. See infra note 150. Congress thus specifically enu-
merated the primary uses of consumer information for which it wanted to
ensure coverage. See infra note 207. Yet Congress also included the business
transaction provision's expansive language within the consumer report defini-
tion to provide flexibility for unanticipated uses. See infra notes 189-90 and
accompanying text. Claim reporting may be an example of such an unantici-
pated use. Moreover, in revising the definitional sections, Congress did not use
clearly restrictive language, such as "only," to indicate an intention that the
enumerated insurance purposes be definitive. Under this analysis, and consis-
tent with the spirit of the Act, see infra note 218 and accompanying text, claim
reports would be regulated as consumer reports.
The better argument, however, is that the FCRA is inapplicable to first
party claim reports. Despite Congress's arguable intent, the language it actu-
ally chose restricts the Act's scope to the enumerated types of insurance re-
ports, see supra note 102, because statutory language should be read to
preserve the substance and effect of the statute's provisions. See inlfra note
159. With the exception of the court in Beresh v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F.
Supp. 260 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (Beresh 1), all courts resolving the issue have con-
cluded that covering claim reports through the business transaction provision
conflicts with § 1681a(d)'s limitations and thus claim reports are excluded. See
supra note 96 and cases cited therein. Moreover, Beresh I does not stand for
the proposition that a claim report used to evaluate a claim for insurance ben-
efits falls within the business transaction provision. In Beresh I, the district
court denied the defendant agency's motion for summary judgment, holding
that the report was procured "in connection with a business transaction" be-
tween the insured and the insurer. Beresh I, 358 F. Supp. at 262. After a trial
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that the business transaction provision should be limited to
on the merits, however, the court disposed of the case on other grounds and
concluded that it was unnecessary to determine whether claim reports are
properly within the FCRA's scope. See Beresh v. Retail Credit Co., Inc., No.
CV 73-240 AWT, slip op. at 6-7 (C.D. Cal. March 3, 1981). Relying on Beresh I
to support a construction of the Act's scope to cover claim reports would
therefore be misplaced. See, e.g., Cochran v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 472 F.
Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Furthermore, because the Beresh I court failed
to engage in a reasoned analysis of the effect of its holding on the statute's lan-
guage, it has been routinely criticized. See Houghton, 795 F.2d at 1150 (citing
Cochran, 472 F. Supp. at 832; Daniels v. Retail Credit Co., No. 72 CV-484
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1976) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Kiblen v. Pickle,
33 Wash. App. 387, 395, 653 P.2d 1338, 1342 (1982).
The Federal Trade Commission's interpretations of the FCRA's scope also
exclude claim reports used to evaluate the merits of a claim for benefits. See
FTC, COMPLIANCE, supra note 49, 11,307, at 59,828-29. The Commission
maintains that claim reports are excluded because they are not used to deter-
mine an applicant's eligibility for insurance, nor are they used in connection
with a business transaction between the insurance company and its insured.
Id. The Commission has consistently affirmed this interpretation in its opin-
ion letters. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Informal Staff Opinion Letter
(July 18, 1978), reprinted in R. CLONTZ, FAIR CREDIT REPORTING MANUAL E-
86 (1986 cum. supp.).
The FCRA's legislative history also suggests that the current consumer re-
port definition does not apply to reports used to evaluate insurance claims. In
1973, Congress held hearings to address specifically the issue of amending the
FCRA to cover claim reporting. See Hearings on S. 2360, supra note 30, at 62.
These hearings, however, failed to produce legislation. After the 1973 hear-
ings, Congress made three more attempts to amend the FCRA's scope to en-
compass claim reports, all of which failed. A 1975 Senate proposal would have
regulated investigative type reports, including claim reports, without regard to
the user's intended actual use of the report, see S. 1840, 94th Congress, 1st
Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 16,329 (1975). A second proposal, designed in part to en-
hance consumer protection in the area of insurance reporting, was introduced
in 1979 and reported to committee, see S. 1928, 96th Congress, 1st Sess., 125
CONG. REc. 29,117 (1979); Fair Financial Information Practices Act: Hearings
on S. 1928 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1324-25, 1330
(1980). The bill would have amended § 1681a(d) to include information used
or collected for insurance claim purposes and § 1681b to permit dissemination
of information in connection with insurance claims. The bill, however, was ap-
parently never reported out of committee. Following the Senate proposals, the
House introduced privacy protection amendments that were referred to com-
mittee. See H.R. 5559, 96th Congress, 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC. 28,184 (1979).
No individual hearings were held, however, and the bill was never reported
out of committee. That Congress did not enact the proposed amendments, in-
dicates that it is not inclined to change the Act's scope. See, e.g., Fox v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 (1935) (rejecting proposed amendments is
indicative of congressional intent).
Another argument for bringing claim reports within the FCRA's scope re-
lies solely on § 1681a(d)'s language. The argument suggests that section
1681a(d)'s "eligibility for... insurance" language should be read broadly to in-
clude a report used to evaluate an insured's eligibility for benefits under an
existing policy in addition to initial eligibility for the policy itself. See Beresh I,
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transactions related to those transactions specified in section
1681a(d), the consumer report definition, and section 1681b, the
incorporated section.120 That is, "a consumer relationship must
exist between the party requesting the report and the report's
subject."' 21 Finding that only the insurance company and its
insured, Rosenfeld, had a consumer relationship, the court con-
cluded that the Equifax report was not an investigative con-
sumer report under the FCRA.2 2 Consequently, the insurance
company was not obligated to disclose the report to
Houghton.23
B. CRITIQUE OF THE CouRT's ANALYSIS
In Houghton the Third Circuit interpreted narrowly the
FCRA in the context of a suit against a report user. The Third
Circuit narrowed the consumer report definition by focusing on
the report's actual use, rejecting any inquiry into the agency's
original collection purpose.124 If employed in the context of a
suit against a consumer reporting agency,12s the Houghton
court's actual use analysis would severely limit the FCRA's
scope by narrowing the category of reports covered by the Act.
For example, when an agency originally collects information
for statutory purposes, the FCRA's express language defines
the information as a consumer report.126 By ignoring the col-
358 F. Supp. at 262 (argument made by plaintiff). "Eligibility," however,
should be interpreted restrictively. See FTC, COMPLIANCE, supra note 49,
11,307, at 59,828. The context of the language should be preserved. "Eligibil-
ity" modifies the phrase "for ... insurance for personal, family, or household
purposes" which, taken as a whole, speaks only to the initial purchase of insur-
ance. See Beresh , 358 F. Supp. at 262.
120. Houghton, 795 F.2d at 1149. The statutory transactions include "credit,
insurance eligibility, employment, or licensing." Id.
121. Id
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1150.
124. Id. at 1148. Although the Third Circuit did not proffer an explanation,
perhaps it rejected the collection purpose test because of the unfairness inher-
ent in holding the insurance company liable for Equifax's collection purposes.
The district court apparently had, in fact, held the insurance company strictly
liable. It found that the Equifax report was a consumer report under the col-
lection purpose test. Houghton, 615 F. Supp. at 303-04. From this holding and
without discussing whether the insurance company had been negligent in its
request, the court held that "[a]s a matter of law," the insurance company had
violated the Act's notice and disclosure provisions. Id. at 305.
125. Houghton involved a suit against the report's user only. A suit against
Equifax, however, has been filed. See supra note 13.
126. The FCRA specifically provides that information "used or collected"
for a statutory purpose is a consumer report and within the Act's scope. See 15
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lection purpose language, courts narrow substantially the con-
sumer report definition's scope, excluding from the Act's
purview reports Congress expressly intended to cover,2 7 and
thus deprive consumers of the right to invoke the FCRA's
protections.128
In particular, the Third Circuit's narrow interpretation in
the context of a consumer reporting agency suit would eviscer-
ate the FCRA's express protections against unbridled dissemi-
nation of consumer reports.12 9 Under the actual use test, an
agency could disseminate information collected as a consumer
report for nonstatutory purposes, and the report would remain
outside the Act's scope.130 For example, agencies could freely
distribute consumer reports at the request of an opposing liti-
gant, a political foe, or a business rival, even when no consumer
transaction with the report's subject is contemplated.1 31 Sec-
tion 1681b and its enforcing provision, section 1681e, however,
expressly restrict the dissemination of consumer reports to con-
sumer transactions.132 Thus, exclusive reliance on the actual
use test to define consumer reports creates structural inconsis-
tencies within the FCRA by rendering sections 1681b and
1681e(a) unenforceable and therefore meaningless. 133
The Third Circuit also suggested that section 1681a(d)'s in-
corporation of section 1681b's business transaction provision
does not expand the consumer report definition's transactional
scope beyond the contours of section 1681a(d).134 This narrow
U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (emphasis added); see infra notes 147-51 and accompanying
text.
127. See infra note 149-50 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of the Act's protections that attach only to consumer
reports, see supra notes 54-60 & 64 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 78 (section 1681b provides that consumer reports may
be released for the specifically enumerated purposes and "no other").
130. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 8 (D. Minn. 1976) (because
report obtained for use in the context of a political battle was used for a non-
statutory purpose, the consumer reporting agency was free to disseminate in-
formation covering plaintiffs personal background, finances, and
employment); Ley v. Boron Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240, 1241-42 (W.D. Pa. 1976)
(because report covering the plaintiff's financial status, employment, marital
status, and other family details was used to ascertain the plaintiff's identity, a
nonstatutory purpose, the agency could disseminate the information freely).
132. See supra note 78.
133. See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
134. Houghton, 795 F.2d at 1149. Accord Cochran v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 472 F. Supp. 827, 831 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (section 1681b as incorporated into
the consumer report definition conforms to § 1681a(d)'s parameters and does
not expand the consumer report definition).
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reading is contrary to the consumer report definition's plain
language, which expressly incorporates, without qualification,
all of section 1681b's purposes.135 This restrictive interpretation
renders the business transaction provision entirely meaning-
less.1
36
III. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT'S
DEFINITIONAL DILEMMA: A NEW METHOD
OF ANALYSIS
The FCRA's scope provisions are ambiguous and circular,
posing considerable problems of interpretation.137 Appropriate
judicial resolution of the Act's definitional dilemma, therefore,
must rely on the statute's legislative history,138 with deference
to its remedial purposes. 39 As a remedial statute, designed to
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(3); supra note 77 and accompanying text (text
of incorporation provision); infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
136. The Third Circuit maintained that "a statute should be interpreted so
as to give effect to every phrase and not render any part superfluous." Hough-
ton, 795 F.2d at 1150. By strictly limiting the business transaction provision to
the other transactions enumerated in the statute, however, the court rendered
that provision superfluous, violating the very rule of statutory construction it
cited in favor of its interpretation. If, for example § 1681b's business transac-
tion provision is limited to the other purposes enumerated in § 1681b, "there
was no reason for Congress to have written it into the statute. Furthermore, if
Congress did not intend that [the business transaction provision] be broader
than the preceding subsections [in § 1681b], it would not have introduced [the
provision] with the words 'otherwise has a legitimate business need' ... ." Ic
at 1151-52 (Sloviter, J., concurring).
137. Courts are not alone in their confusion. During the floor debate on
the bill's conference report, Congressman Brown stated that, notwithstanding
the unanimous support for the legislation, "there is considerable confusion
about how this bill will be interpreted. The definitions are so vague that no
one is certain what is included as a 'consumer credit report."' 116 CONG. REC.
36,575-76 (1970). Congressman Wylie agreed: "It is really unfortunate that we
must legislate in a manner [that] leaves so many questions unanswered....
Inasmuch as there will probably be no bill on consumer credit reporting this
year unless we accept the [proposed bill], I reluctantly recommend acceptance
of the report." Id at 36,575. Congressman Brown advised that "[d]espite rules
of interpretation... any questions of interpretation [should be resolved] in
favor of the intent expressed" Id at 36,576 (emphasis added).
138. A well accepted principle of statutory construction states that when a
statute's meaning is ambiguous, courts may properly resort to its legislative
history. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254 (1956). See generally 2A
SUTHERLAND, supra note 69, §§ 48.01-.20, at 277-346 (discussing and citing cases
on the use of legislative history in statutory construction).
139. The purpose to be accomplished by legislation is a reflection of legisla-
tive intent. The primary principle governing statutory construction is to dis-
cover, declare, and give effect to the legislature's intent. United States v.
Henning, 344 U.S. 66, 71-75 (1952); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779,
783 (1952). Therefore, to give effect to the remedial purpose of the FCRA is to
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create consumer protections in the consumer reporting area,
the FCRA is entitled to a liberal construction. 140 Courts there-
fore should adopt a consumer-oriented approach 41 that expan-
sively interprets the consumer report definition, with limited
exceptions.
To fairly effectuate the FCRA's remedial purposes and give
credence to the language of the consumer report definition,
courts should make two inquiries and should distinguish be-
tween user and agency defendants. In all FCRA cases, the first
inquiry should be the same: courts should examine the report's
actual use. If used for a statutory purpose, the report falls
within the consumer report definition. The second inquiry re-
quires courts to distinguish between defendants. When the de-
fendant is a consumer reporting agency, courts should look to
the agency's original collection purpose. If the agency origi-
nally collected any of the report's information for a statutory
purpose, the report is a consumer report with respect to the
agency.142 When the defendant is a report user, however, the
give effect to Congress's intent. See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 69,
§ 45.05, at 20-7 (discussion and collection of case law on the supremacy of legis-
lative intent in statutory construction).
140. It is firmly established that, as a matter of policy, remedial statutes
are to be liberally construed. See Abbot Laboratories v. Portland Retail Drug-
gists Ass'n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 11 (1976); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65 (1968);
McBurney v. Carson, 99 U.S. 567, 569 (1878). A liberal construction is one that
has the effect of rendering the statute applicable in more situations than
would be the case under a narrow construction. See, e.g., Tenney v. Springer,
121 Mich. App. 47, 53 n.1, 328 N.W.2d 566, 569 n.1 (1982).
141. One other commentator has argued in favor of reading the consumer
report definition expansively to favor consumers. See Note, The Fair Credit
Reporting Ac4 13 SuFFoLK U.L. REv. 63 (1979). That Note's interpretation,
however, fails to recognize the limitations that must be imposed on an expan-
sive reading of the FCRA's scope provisions. See infra notes 163-77 and ac-
companying text (collection purpose language only applies to user with notice
of agency's collection purposes), and notes 195-98 and accompanying text
(when incorporation of § 1681b's business transaction provision conflicts with
§ 1681a(d)'s consumer report definition, § 1681a(d) controls). Moreover, the
Note endorsed the interpretation enunciated in Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392
F. Supp. 1356, 1359-60 (D. Ariz. 1975), that a report is a consumer report if it
"could be used" for a statutory purpose. Note, supra, at 93. The Belshaw test,
however, is overbroad, going beyond the FCRA's language, and thus should be
rejected. See, e.g., Henry v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5, 9 n.5 (D. Minn. 1976) (The
Belshaw court's test "goes beyond the avowed [purpose] of Congress" and
"would bring within the [FCRA's scope] any gathering of information about an
individual." Courts "cannot read into the statute provisions that do not ex-
ist."); Mende v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 670 F.2d 129, 133 (9th Cir. 1982) (not-
ing the Henry court's criticisms of the Belshaw court's test and declining to
follow Belshaw).
142. See infra notes 147-62 and accompanying text.
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collection purpose test is used only to the extent that the user
had notice of the agency's original collection motives. 143
Additionally, courts should read the consumer report defi-
nition's incorporation provision expansively. Absent a direct
conflict with section 1681a(d)'s restrictive language, section
1681b's business transaction provision should be allowed to ex-
pand the transactions encompassed by the consumer report def-
inition. In the case of a conflict, however, section 1681a(d)'s
restrictive language should take precedence.
A. THE USER/AGENCY DISTINCTION: APPROPRIATE USE OF
THE COLLECTION PURPOSE AND ACTUAL USE TESTS
Current FCRA litigation reflects an unarticulated distinc-
tion between agency and user defendants. Although some
courts facing agency defendants have been willing to employ
the collection purpose test, 44 courts presented with user de-
fendants have almost never done so.145 In the user context,
courts perhaps reject the collection purpose test because of the
143. See infra notes 163-77 and accompanying text.
144. See Heath v. Credit Bureau, 618 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1980); Ippolito
v. WNS, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 471, 473 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Boothe v. TRW Credit
Data, 523 F. Supp. 631, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Beishaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F.
Supp. 1356, 1361 (D. Ariz. 1975); Rasor v. Retail Credit Co., 87 Wash. 2d 516,
522-23, 554 P.2d 1041, 1046 (1976). Other courts, however, refuse to use the col-
lection purpose test in the context of an agency defendant. See Gardner v. In-
vestigators, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 780, 781 (M.D. Fla. 1976); Daniels v. Retail Credit
Co., No. 73-CV-484 (N.D.N.Y. April 28, 1976) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); Horton v. Pinkerton's Inc., No. H-75-C-17 (E.D. La. 1972).
145. See, e.g., Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144 (3d Cir.
1986); Matthews v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 741 F.2d 217 (8th Cir. 1984);
D'Angelo v. Wilmington Medical Center, 515 F. Supp. 1250 (D. Del. 1981); Ley
v. Boron Oil Co., 419 F. Supp. 1240 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Sizemore v. Bambi Leasing
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Ga. 1973). But see Rice v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 450 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (where user requested all infor-
mation in the consumer's file, the credit data was probably collected for a stat-
utory purpose and was thus a consumer report); Boothe, 523 F. Supp. at 634
(court must determine agency's original purpose for collecting report's infor-
mation to decide whether the report was a consumer report with respect to its
user).
When presented with agency and user defendants in the same suit, courts
have failed to make a distinction between the defendants when analyzing the
report's status under the FCRA. Most courts have instead applied the actual
use test to both. See Cochran v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp.. 827, 833
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (the court dismissed the suit against the user and indicated
that it would apply the same analysis in deciding the agency's motion); Henry
v. Forbes, 433 F. Supp. 5 (D. Minn. 1976); Kiblen v. Pickle, 33 Wash. App. 387,
653 P.2d 1338 (1982). But see Boothe, 523 F. Supp. 631, 634 (court decided collec-




unfairness inherent in holding a user liable for an agency's col-
lection purposes.146 Those courts rejecting the collection pur-
pose test, however, never proffer an explanation for ignoring
the Act's plain language. Because courts fail to recognize the
implicit reasons for a distinction, they bypass opportunities to
provide a reasoned analysis for treating users and agencies dif-
ferently. In the future, appropriate FCRA analysis should be
based expressly upon the user/agency dichotomy.
When the defendant is a consumer reporting agency, the
"used or collected" language should be interpreted expan-
sively147 by examining both the agency's original collection pur-
pose and the report's actual use.148 The collection purpose
language indicates that Congress intended the FCRA's provi-
sions to apply when agencies collect information "in whole or
in part" for statutory purposes.149 Congress carefully chose the
"used or collected" language through successive and deliberate
revisions of the Act's scope provisions to ensure that the FCRA
would achieve its remedial purposes. 150 Moreover, through the
146. See, e.g., supra note 124.
147. See supra note 84 and cases cited therein.
148. This broad bifurcated construction is supported by both the legislative
history, see S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969) (Section 1681a(d) de-
fines consumer report "as a report on the individual when the information has
been collected or is to be used" for a statutory purpose.) (emphasis added), and
the Federal Trade Commission's interpretation of the FCRA, see FTC, COM-
PLIANcE, supra note 49, % 11,305, at 59,803 (A consumer report is information
communicated, and "it must be either used or expected to be used or it must
have been collected in whole or in part" for a permissible purpose.) (emphasis
added).
149. See supra note 86 and cases cited therein. Where the language of a
statutory provision is clear, the words used are considered the final expression
of legislative intent. Burns v. Alcaca, 420 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975); Federal
Trade Conm'n v. Manager, Retail Credit Co., 515 F.2d 988, 995 n.14 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Absent evidence that a statute's words or provisions are the result of an
obvious mistake, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that effect
must be given to every word or phrase. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 69,
§ 46.06.
150. The legislative hearings on the Fair Credit Reporting bill, and the pri-
vacy hearings in the immediately preceding years, had uncovered numerous
abuses in the reporting industry. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Congress believed, and the legislative hearings on S. 823 confirmed, that the
most egregious abuses occurred in the areas of insurance and employment re-
porting. See Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 65. Senator Proxmire in-
tended that his bill cover all forms of consumer reporting, id. at 77, and
originally believed that his bill's definitions, as expanded in 1969, see supra
note 69, would encompass insurance and employment reporting in addition to
credit reporting. Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 65 ("It is my under-
standing that we included character and general reputation so that we could
specifically include insurance reporting and employment."). Numerous wit-
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"used or collected" language, Congress created a presumption
that any information released by a consumer reporting agency
is a consumer report. 15 ' Expansive interpretation of the "used
or collected" language, therefore, encourages agency compli-
ance152 and maximizes consumer rights.1 53
nesses, however, testified to the inadequacy of the bill's language and sug-
gested that the bill's scope be made more clear. See, e.g., id. at 74, 115. In
response, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency reported out a re-
drafted bill that deliberately broadened the consumer report definition. See
supra note 69. Given the "hours and days and weeks and months" spent by
the Senate Committee and industry representatives formulating the consumer
report definition, Hearings on H. 16340, supra note 39, at 108 (statement of
John L. Spafford, President, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc.), the addition of
the "used or collected" language and the incorporation provision cannot be dis-
regarded as mere afterthought. It should be recognized as deliberate action
taken to ensure achievement of the Act's remedial goals. See Gilbert v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 347 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (E.D. Va 1972) (When a bill's legisla-
tive history demonstrates that the language was purposefully added, it "must
be given full syntactical weight.").
151. Consumer reporting agencies presumptively collect information for
statutory purposes. See Heath v. Credit Bureau, 618 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir.
1980) ("[I]f at the time the information was collected, the agency expected it to
be used for proper purposes, a transmittal of that information would be a con-
sumer report."); Hanson v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting
that absent suggestion that agency collected information for nonstatutory pur-
poses, agency in the business of supplying consumer reports must have col-
lected information for statutory purposes). Dissemination of information
collected for a statutory purpose constitutes a consumer report regardless of
the information's actual use. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. More-
over, when an agency disseminates information without knowing the request-
ing party's intended use, courts may reasonably assume that the agency
expected the information to be used for statutory purposes. Heath, 618 F.2d at
696, cited in Ippolito v. WNS, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 471, 473 (N.D. M. 1986). Con-
sumer reporting agencies' collection and dissemination activities, therefore, are
presumptively within the confines of the FCRA. To overcome this presump-
tion of the Act's applicability, an agency should bear the burden of presenting
evidence sufficient to demonstrate that its activities were outside the FCRA or
that it does not qualify as a consumer reporting agency as defined by the Act.
152. If agencies were put on notice that they must comply with the FCRA
from the moment information is collected, they would have an incentive to en-
sure that information they collect is accurate. Agencies would know that they
must employ procedures designed to ensure maximum accuracy from the time
of the information's collection or face liability for a complaint later. Although
a failure to comply at the time of collection would not be detected until the
information is actually used and a complaint is brought, agencies should view
compliance at the earlier collection date as less costly and more efficient than
the alternative of trying to make the information accurate at the time of trans-
mission when months or even years may have passed and the original sources
may no longer be available for verification. Agencies, knowing that courts will
apply the collection purpose language in determining liability, would find it in
their intersts to comply with the Act from the time of collection. The in-
creased likelihood that information transmitted would be accurate would ben-
efit consumers.
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Moreover, applying the collection purpose test appropri-
ately gives effect to Congress's intention that regulation com-
mence when agencies collect information for statutory
purposes. Originally, Congress intended regulation to begin
when an agency disseminated a consumer report. 54 That
scheme would have prohibited agencies from reusing informa-
tion for a purpose different from their original collection pur-
pose, thereby requiring them to re-collect information with
each new request.155 Eventually recognizing the infeasibility of
this prohibition, Congress compromised by permitting reuse in
exchange for commencing regulation when information is col-
lected.156 The collection purpose language was deliberately
153. See supra notes 54-60 & 64 and accompanying text (discussing rights
that are only enforceable when the information communicated is a consumer
report).
154. The original definitional section proposed by Senator Proxmire acti-
vated the statute's regulations when information was "sought or given" for a
statutory purpose. See 114 CONG. REC. 24,904 (1968); supra note 69.
155. See infra note 156.
156. The collection purpose language found in the current consumer report
definition evolved in part for the following reason. The 1969 Fair Credit Re-
porting Bill's permissible dissemination provision, S. 823, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 164(f), 115 CoNG. REc. 2415 (1969), restricted agencies' right to release con-
sumer information to "the purposes disclosed in the collection of the informa-
tion." See supra note 69 (quoting § 164(f)(2)). Senator Proxmire included this
restrictive provision as a privacy protection measure to ensure that informa-
tion initially collected for one purpose could not subsequently be used for a
different purpose. See 115 CONG. REc. 2415 (1969); Hearings on S. 823, supra
note 35, at 239.
When the bill was reported to the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, § 164(f)'s "for the purposes disclosed in the collection of the informa-
tion" language met with vehement opposition. Every reporting industry
representative who testified opposed the provision because it would have pre-
cluded reuse of collected information, thereby destroying the whole concept of
the reporting industry. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 823, supra note 35, at 143 (John
L. Spafford, Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc. asserting that § 164(f) would re-
quire reinvestigation in every instance, would eliminate the need to accumu-
late information, and "could literally destroy the credit bureau concept").
Ostensibly recognizing the onerous burden the provision would entail for
the industry, the committee redrafted both the permissible dissemination pro-
vision and the consumer report definition. The disputed language in the 1969
bill's dissemination provision was deleted from its successor. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b (1982). To counterbalance this change, however, Congress apparently
inserted into the redrafted consumer report definition the "used or expected
to be used or collected in whole or in part" language. Compare § 164(f), supra
note 69 (1969 bill's version of the permissible dissemination provision) with 15
U.S.C. § 1681b (the permissible dissemination provision as reported out of com-
mittee and subsequently enacted); compare § 163(b), (c), supra note 69 (1969
bill's version of the consumer report definition) with 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (the
consumer report definition as reported out of committee and subsequently en-
acted). This legislative compromise satisfied both Congress and the reporting
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drafted into the FCRA as the result of this compromise.157 Ex-
pansive interpretation of the "used or collected" language,
therefore, ensures that agencies are regulated to the extent in-
tended by Congress. 158
Conversely, ignoring the agency's original collection pur-
pose by exclusively using the actual use test violates rules of
statutory construction requiring that the substance and effect
of all sections be preserved' 59 and that the construction of a re-
medial statute effectuate the statute's manifest purpose.
160 If
industry: previously collected information can be reused by agencies, see 15
U.S.C. § 1681b (no restrictions on reuse), and, in exchange, the Act's regula-
tions and consumer rights are triggered by the collection of information for
statutory purposes, not solely by its actual use. See S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 (1969) (the Act applies to reports containing information collected
for statutory purposes).
The collection purpose language, intentionally inserted into the consumer
report definition, is an important legislative compromise that courts should
not ignore. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S.
463, 468 (1968) (when legislation is the product of opposing views and compro-
mise, courts must analyze the bill's language in light of its legislative history
and the bill's overall purposes); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus,
361 F. Supp. 689, 698-99 (E.D. Va. 1973) (when a bill emerges from vigorous
legislative debate, its syntactical history should be accorded substantial weight
in its interpretation); see generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 69, § 48.04, at
302 (legislative debate surrounding the bill's language is important in ascer-
taining its meaning and effect). See also infra note 190 (detailing another pur-
pose behind the legislative compromise involving the "used or collected"
language).
157. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. The redrafted definitional
sections were never presented to the floor of the Senate for an independent
vote. Rather, they were part of a wholesale approval of the bill as redrafted
by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency. See 115 CONG. REC.
33,404-406 (1969) (redrafted bill reported to the floor of the Senate); id at
33,413 (bill passed as amended by the committee).
158. The "used or collected" language, specifically drafted into the statute
as part of a legislative compromise, was intended to broaden the FCRA and to
serve in part as a substitute for ongoing regulatory enforcement. Therefore, it
must be given full effect to comport with Congress's regulatory intent. See
supra note 156 and infra note 190. Moreover, the Senate report accompanying
the bill as reported out of committee suggested an expansive interpretation of
the "used or collected" language, and thus evidences the extent of Congress's
regulatory intent. See supra note 148.
159. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778-89 (1983) (noting the Court's
reluctance to interpret a statute in a way that renders any part superfluous);
Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 833 (1983) (the substance and effect of a
statute's provisions should be preserved); Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112,
115-16 (1879) (adopting the cannon of construction that a statute should be in-
terpreted to maintain the substance and effect of its provisions).
160. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (judicial con-
struction of remedial legislation should seek to effectute the statute's pur-
poses); Heitler v. United States, 260 U.S. 438, 440 (1923) (remedial statutes
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consumers are allowed to maintain suits only when a report is
actually used for the purposes enumerated, sections 1681b and
1681e(a), which are central to the FCRA's purposes, become
meaningless and unenforceable. 161 Information used for non-
statutory purposes would not be a consumer report and thus
agencies could provide information to third parties with
impunity.162
"should be construed liberally to carry out the evident purpose of Congress");
supra note 140.
161. See Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 523 F. Supp. 631, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(sole reliance on the report's actual use defeats the statute's structure by ren-
dering superfluous § 1681b and thus impedes protection of file confidentiality
and consumer privacy); Belshaw v. Credit Bureau, 392 F. Supp. 1356, 1359-60(D. Ariz. 1975) (limiting judicial inquiry to the report's actual use precludes
enforcement of § 1681b and thus leaves consumers' privacy unprotected and
frustrates Congress's remedial goals).
In Boothe, the court explained the anomaly:
Defendants would have this court hold that the release of a consumer
report... for a purpose not permitted by the Act converts the report
into one outside the scope of the Act. Such a holding would render
section 1681b, which restricts the release of consumer reports to cer-
tain specified circumstances, totally ineffective.
523 F. Supp. at 634. Section 1681b's language presupposes that a report can be
defined as a consumer report independent of the report's actual use. See 15
U.S.C. § 1681b (an agency can furnish "consumer reports" for the enumerated
purposes and no other). When a report's actual use is the sole test of its status
under the FCRA, an agency can never violate § 1681b.
Moreover, § 1681e(a), requiring agencies to employ reasonable procedures
to comply with § 1681b's restrictions, see supra note 80, would also be mean-
ingless and unenforceable. Thus, the narrow construction of the "used or col-
lected" language is inconsistent with the Act's structure and should be
rejected. Cf United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 582-83 (1981) (statutes
should be construed in such a way that avoids internal inconsistencies).
162. The legislative history and the Act's statement of purpose manifest
congressional concern for consumer privacy, confidentiality, and the need to
end abusive practices by consumer reporting agencies. See supra notes 34, 41
& 80 and accompanying text. Courts are bound to give effect to the legisla-
ture's expressed intent. See supra note 139. Section 1681b mandates that con-
sumer reporting agencies may disseminate consumer reports for the
enumerated purposes and no other. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b; see also Zamora v. Val-
ley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 811 F.2d 1368, 1370 (10th Cir. 1987) (agencies can
disseminate consumer reports only for one of the enumerated statutory pur-
poses). When courts refuse to apply the collection purpose language to con-
sumer reporting agencies, agencies are free to disseminate highly sensitive
information to anyone who desires the information. See supra note 131 and
accompanying text. Such unrestrained dissemination violates legislative in-
tent. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. In Henry v. Forbes, 433 F.
Supp. 5 (D. Minn. 1976), for example, an attorney obtained a report for polit-
ical purposes through a client's account with a regulated consumer reporting
agency. Id at 6-7. The report contained financial, employment, and personal
background data on the plaintiff. Id at 6. The information was presumptively
collected by the agency for a statutory purpose, and subsequent transmittal of
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Courts, however, should limit their use of the collection
purpose test when the defendant is a consumer report user.
When a user requests a report on the good faith belief that it is
not covered by the Act, the user should be able to rely on its
limited request.163 If the agency includes preexisting informa-
tion originally collected for a statutory purpose, the report's
user should not be held liable based on the agency's collection
motives unless the user has notice from the agency,1' the face
of the report,16 5 or business customs' 66 that the report includes
the information should have constituted a consumer report regulated by the
Act. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. The court, however, focusing
exclusively on actual use, held that the report was not a consumer report
within the Act. Henry, 433 F. Supp. at 10. The court commented:
If the [actual use] of the report is not among the enumerated purposes
which define "consumer report," any person with access to a report-
ing agency account may with any motive request personal and credit
information about a private individual, cause an investigation to be
made without the subject's knowledge, and act on the information-
without giving the subject any of the protections against inaccuracy
and misuse that are provided in the Act.
Id at 9-10.
The Henry court's interpretation of the FCRA subverts the Act's purpose.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text (FCRA intended to protect con-
sumer privacy and confidentiality). Under the facts of the Henry case, the re-
port contained data originally collected for statutory purposes. In holding that
the report as actually used was not a consumer report, the court effectively
precluded enforcement of §§ 1681b and 1681e(a), leaving the plaintiff without a
remedy although Congress intended to provide one. See supra note 80 and ac-
companying text.
Unfortunately, the Henry opinion has been cited with approval. See New
Palm Gardens v. Bentley, No. 82-1361-MA (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 1983) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file). But see Rice v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 450 F.
Supp. 668, 672 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (declining to follow the Henry court's decision
because its restrictive view of the Act's scope is unsupported by the consumer
report definition's language).
163. For example, a request for a first party claim report limited to con-
temporaneously compiled information would be a basis for a good faith belief
that the report is not covered by the FCRA. Limiting the request to contem-
poraneously compiled information avoids the possibility of finding a consumer
report under the collection purpose test. Moreover, when an insurer requests
a first party claim report to assess the validity of a claim by an insured, the
report's actual use is not within the scope of the business transaction provision
because of the consumer report definition's limitation to insurance reports for
determining eligibility for coverage or fitness for underwriting. See supra note
119 and accompanying text. The claim report, therefore, is not a consumer re-
port under the Act. See Cochran v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp.
827, 831-32 (N.D. Ga. 1979); but see Beresh v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp.
260, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (the business transaction provision encompasses a
first party claim report).
164. Notice from the agency could be either a written or oral affirmation of
the report's status as a consumer report.
165. Courts should take a more liberal approach than the Third Circuit
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regulated information. 167 The Third Circuit's more stringent
notice standard should be rejected.168
The collection purpose language, which looks to the
agency's subjective intent for collecting information,169 if ap-
plied to users, may result in strict liability when the user is un-
aware that the report qualifies as a consumer report. 7 0
Congress, however, expressly rejected a strict liability standard
for the FCRA by providing a private cause of action only for
took in Houghton in assessing the presence of notice from the report's face.
See supra note 113. If the report clearly indicates that preexisting files have
been searched, see supra note 8, the user has constructive notice that a con-
sumer report has been received because agencies presumptively collect data
for statutory purposes. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. The only
exceptions to this standard of notice should arise when the user knows either
that the agency maintains differentiated services, see infra note 231, or that
the agency does not qualify as a consumer reporting agency. See supra note 20
(consumer reporting agency is a requisite element of the consumer report
definition).
166. This standard prevents users from circumventing compliance with the
FCRA by requesting a report for a purpose outside the Act when standard in-
dustry procedure for the type of report requested is to include regulated infor-
mation. For example, if claim reports regularly contain financial information,
which the requesting party should assume will come from preexisting files, see
infra note 232, the user is charged with knowledge of industry customs and
must comply with the Act. To protect consumers adequately, courts must look
beyond the simple request to the request's substance.
167. This standard of notice requires that the user "know or have reason to
know" of the agency's collection purposes. For a discussion of such a standard
of knowledge, see RESTATEmNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19(2) (1979); id
§ 19 comment b ("the words 'reason to know' are used both where the actor
has a duty to another [to ascertain facts] and where he would not be acting
adequately in the protection of his own interests were he not acting with refer-
ence to the facts which he has reason to know"); see generally PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 182-85 (1984) (discussing the requirement of
knowledge in a cause of action for negligence); 58 AM. JuP. 2D Notice §§ 3, 6
(1971) (discussing actual and constructive notice).
168. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
169. Heath v. Credit Bureau, 618 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir. 1980). But see
D'Angelo v. Wilmington Medical Center, 515 F. Supp. 1250, 1254 (D. Del. 1981)
("collected" language focuses on the user's expectations and intentions). The
D'Angelo interpretation of the collection purpose language is plainly incorrect.
Users only collect information in the sense that they request it from an
agency. If the collection purpose language looks to the user's intent and not
the agency's, it adds nothing to the consumer report definition, and Congress
need not have written it into the statute. Congress intended the collection
purpose language to look to the agency's subjective intent. See, e.g., 114 CONG.
REC. 24,902 (1968) (stating that the Fair Credit Reporting Bill requires agen-
cies to maintain procedures "guaranteeing the confidentiality of the informa-
tion they collect" (emphasis added)).
170. See e.g., supra note 124 (in Houghton, the district court apparently
held the insurance company strictly liable).
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negligent 71 or willful172 misconduct. Thus, the collection pur-
pose language should not apply to consumer report users, un-
less the user knew or had reason to know of the agency's
collection purpose.173
A close examination of section 1681d also suggests that
Congress did not intend literal application of the collection pur-
pose language to user defendants. A user violates section 1681d
when it "procures" or "causes" an agency to prepare an investi-
gative consumer report and then fails to notify or disclose as re-
quired.'7 4 This language presupposes knowledge of the type of
report requested. An anomalous result is reached if a user is
held liable on the basis of a report that is covered by the
FCRA solely by virtue of the agency's collection purposes.
Finally, a less than literal interpretation of the "used or
collected" language in lawsuits against report users, one that ig-
nores the collection purpose language when notice is absent,
does not raise the same structural inconsistencies within the
statute as it does with respect to agency defendants.175 Sections
1681b and 1681e(a) are left intact because they do not apply to
users. s7 6 Moreover, the distinction does not interfere with the
remedial effect of the FCRA. The principal mechanism for at-
taining the legislature's objectives is through the regulation of
consumer reporting agencies; users are only secondarily
regulated.177
This Comment's suggested analysis resolves the gray-area
cases, such as those involving an insurance claim report or a
business report on an individual consumer, that have proved
problematic for courts in the past.178 If the defendant is a con-
sumer reporting agency or a report user, such reports would
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.
172. Id § 1681n.
173. See supra note 167 and text accompanying notes 164-67.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1681d; see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
176. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (restricting consumer reporting agencies' right to
lawfully disseminate consumer reports); id § 1681e(a) (requiring consumer re-
porting agencies to use reasonable procedures to ensure proper use of con-
sumer reports).
177. See supra note 53.
178. Case law conflicts on whether reports containing consumer informa-
tion used in a business context are covered by the FCRA. See supra notes 88-
91 and accompanying text. Courts also have differed regarding whether
§ 1681b's business transaction provision can be interpreted to expand the
transactional scope of § 1681a(d)'s consumer report definition to encompass re-
ports that are not used for one of § 1681a(d)'s enumerated transactions. See
supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
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not come within the FCRA's scope under the actual use test.179
Application of the collection purpose test, however, may bring
these reports within the Act's scope. If the report contains any
information originally collected for a statutory purpose, it is,
with respect to the agency, a consumer report within the
FCRA's scope.'80 The identical analysis, modified by the notice
179. The FCRA's consumer report definition expressly applies to insurance
reports obtained to establish the subject's eligibility for insurance or fitness for
underwriting. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a(d), 1681b(3)(C); supra notes 20, 78. An
insurance claim report obtained to evaluate a first party claim, therefore, must
come within the consumer report definition under the business transaction
provision if at all. In this situation, the consumer report definition's restrictive
language limiting the insurance reports covered must take precedence, not be-
cause a claim report is not obtained in connection with a business transaction,
but because Congress's express limitations on the Act's scope control. See
supra notes 98 & 119. Conversely, third party claim reports, generally ob-
tained for litigation purposes, do not conflict with the statute's express limita-
tions. They are sometimes excluded, however, because the requisite consumer
transaction between the report's procurer and subject is absent. See infra text
accompanying notes 224-30.
Similarly, reports used in connection with a business's credit or insurance
transactions are not within the consumer report definition under the actual
use test. Section 1681a(d) expressly limits the Act's coverage of insurance and
credit reports to those obtained in connection with a "personal, family, or
household" transaction. See Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Let-
ter, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) f 99,422, at
89,382 (May 18, 1971); FTC, COMPLIANCE, supra note 49, % 11,307, at 59,828.
Moreover, Congress intended to exclude all forms of commercial reporting
from the FCRA. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
180. The Federal Trade Commission advocates this interpretation. See Ex-
cerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder]
Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 1 99,424, at 89,384 (May 19, 1971) ("[I]f the infor-
mation was originally collected for consumer purposes and then was subse-
quently used in a business credit or business insurance report, then such a
report would become a consumer report as defined in the Act."); FTC, COMPLI-
ANCE, supra note 49, % 11,305, at 59,828 (when an agency uses file information
originally collected for statutory purposes in a claim report, the report be-
comes a regulated consumer report). The FTC further argues that it is im-
proper for the agency to use consumer report information in insurance claim
reports or in business reports because these uses constitute improper dissemi-
nation purposes under § 1681b. This Comment endorses that view with re-
spect to first party insurance claim reports, see supra note 119 and text infra
accompanying notes 199-203 (reports used to evaluate first party insurance
claims do not fall within § 1681b's business transaction provision and thus it
would be improper to disseminate regulated consumer report information for
such claim reporting purposes). The better view, however, is to allow dissemi-
nation of consumer report information for business purposes at the cost of
compliance with the Act. See generally Note, supra note 82, at 1249-51 (argu-
ing that agencies should be allowed to disseminate consumer reports for com-
mercial purposes if they comply with the Act because the FTC's more limited
interpretation is anomalous in light of the collection purpose language, the
business transaction provision's plain language authorizes dissemination for
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requirement, applies to a user defendant. 8 1 Courts should not
be troubled by the incongruent results yielded under the collec-
tion purpose and actual use tests. By its language, Congress
formulated two conceptually distinct and independent tests for
consumer report status, and the report need only qualify under
one to bring it within the Act's scope.' 8 2
B. RECONCILING SECTIONS 1681A(D) AND 1681B: DEFINING
THE FCRA's TRANSACTIONAL SCOPE
A further definitional problem, arising under the FCRA in
connection with the actual use test,183 involves the appropriate
interpretation of the consumer report definition's incorporation
business transactions with the individual, and the FTC's limited construction
does not enhance the FCRA regulatory scheme). The FCRA was not intended
to restrict the flow of information to the business community. See infra note
203 and accompanying text. Moreover, disallowing dissemination ignores the
problem of a sole proprietorship-information on the individual is virtually in-
distinguishable from information on the business. Refusing to permit lawful
dissemination of information concerning the business's principal could seri-
ously impede the business's access to credit and insurance inasmuch as lenders
and insurers demand information to evaluate risks. Congress expressly ad-
dressed this issue and only acknowledged the difficulty of distinguishing re-
ports on the principal as an individual, and therefore within the Act, from
those on the sole proprietorship, and therefore not within the Act. See Hear-
ings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 16-17. Congress expressed no intention to re-
strict dissemination of information in the business report context. Id Finally,
transmitting information in connection with a business credit or business in-
surance transaction falls within the literal language of the business transaction
provision and, therefore, should be treated as a permissible dissemination
purpose.
181. The report would not be a consumer report with respect to the user
unless the user had notice of a statutory collection purpose.
182. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. Congress's use of the dis-junctive word "or" separating the "used" and "collected" language, see supra
note 20, indicates that the actual use test and the collection purpose test are
independent of each other. See, e.g., United States v. O'Driscoll, 761 F.2d 589,
597 (10th Cir. 1985) ("or" is presumed disjunctive absent clear legislative in-
tent to the contrary), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1207 (1986).
183. The incorporation issue focuses on the incorporation of the business
transaction provision. See supra note 81. This issue does not arise in connec-
tion with the collection purpose test because the collection purpose language
in the consumer report definition does not modify the business transaction
provision. Consumer reporting agencies are in the business of collecting infor-
mation for specific and potential requests in connection with consumers' gen-
eral credit, employment, or insurance transactions, without knowing if, when,
or by whom the information will eventually be requested and used in connec-
tion with a specific business transaction. Agencies thus generally collect con-
sumer information for the enumerated consumer transaction purposes. Any




of section 1681b. A liberal construction of the incorporation
provision' s4 would bring information used "in connection with
a business transaction involving the consumer" 18 5 within the
consumer report definition, with limited exceptions.
A broad interpretation of the incorporation provision com-
ports with Congress's intent that section 1681a(d) not be the
sole determinant of the FCRA's transactional scope.'8 6 Reading
sections 1681a(d) and 1681b together, as the incorporation pro-
vision requires, courts should recognize that section 1681b's
business transaction provision expands the consumer report
definition beyond the contours of section 1681a(d). 8 7 The
FCRA's legislative history demonstrates that Congress added
the incorporation provision as part of a deliberate revision of
the consumer report definition to broaden the Act's scope to
ensure that the FCRA would achieve its intended remedial
effect.188
The intentional broadening of the FCRA also reflects Con-
gress's attempt to ensure the Act's continued vitality in the face
of unanticipated circumstances. Under pressure from the re-
porting industry, Congress refused to grant substantive enforce-
ment power of the FCRA to a federal agency.L8 9  To
counterbalance this concession, Congress broadened the con-
sumer report definition through incorporation of the business
transaction provision. 90 This compromise was Congress's at-
tempt to expand the Act's scope to ensure sufficient flexibility
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(3).
185. I& § 1681b(3)(E).
186. The plain language of the incorporation provision evidences Con-
gress's intention that the Act's scope extend beyond the limits of § 1681a(d).
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 95 and cases cited therein. But see Note, supra note 98,
at 471 (arguing that § 1681b only supplements § 1681a(d)'s consumer report
definition and does not independently expand the Act's transactional scope).
188. See supra note 150.
189. See infra note 190.
190. Congress originally intended to vest the Federal Reserve Board with
the power to promulgate regulations to be enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission. See 114 CoNG. REc. 24,904 (1968); Hearings on S. 823, supra note
35, at 30. During the hearings on S. 823, however, the FTC argued that pro-
mulgation and enforcement power should be vested solely in the Commission.
Id "[Tihe argument was made that the FTC needed the power to promulgate
regulations in order to have the necessary flexibility to enable it to provide
proper enforcement." Hearings on H. 16340, supra note 39, at 114 (state-
ment of John L. Spafford, President Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., recap-
ping the debate on regulatory power during the hearings on S. 823). The
power to issue and enforce substantive regulations was viewed as an integral
factor to the overall success and versatility of the legislation. See Hearings on
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to provide consumers with continuing protection in the absence
of ongoing regulatory enforcement.191 The incorporation provi-
sion, as an integral part of that compromise, should be given
full effect.
Moreover, failure to allow section 1681b's business transac-
tion provision to expand the consumer report definition violates
the rule of statutory construction requiring that the substance
and effect of a statute's provisions be preserved.192 The man-
date of the incorporation provision is clear. The consumer re-
port definition expressly incorporates, without limitation, all
"other purposes" enumerated in section 1681b. 193 When a stat-
ute's language is clear on its face, courts should avoid an alter-
native construction. 94
S. 823, supra note 35, at 30 (statement of Paul Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission).
The reporting industry, however, was strongly opposed to giving substan-
tive enforcement power to any federal agency. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R
16340, supra note 39, at 114-15 (statement of John L. Spafford, President, As-
sociated Credit Bureaus, Inc. recapping industry position in the hearings on S.
823). The industry argued that the FTC could effectively enforce the Act
without rulemaking power and that the confusion in interpretation and en-
forcement that attends profuse regulatory schemes should be avoided. Id. The
industry preferred a clearly written, self-enforcing law. Id at 452.
Responding to industry opposition, the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency substantially redrafted all of the FCRA's provisions. Compare Hear-
ings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 4-9 (original bill reported to committee) with
115 CONG. REC. 33,404-06 (1969) (bill as reported out of committee). Signifi-
cantly, Congress eliminated the Federal Reserve Board's role and refused to
expand the FTC's role beyond administrative enforcement. The FTC's power
extends only to issuing procedural rules and enforcing general compliance.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s.
In exchange, Congress deliberately expanded the Act's scope by drafting
the "used or collected" language and the incorporation provision into the con-
sumer report definition. See supra note 69. These broadening provisions are
substitutes for the flexibility and adaptability rulemaking power would have
provided. At the joint conference on S. 823, the House conferees offered an
amendment to the bill to vest the FTC with rulemaking power. See 116 CoNG.
REC. 36,571 (1970). The Senate conferees adamantly resisted the amendment.
Id Both the Senate and the House conferees, however, agreed that the omis-
sion would not be "fatal to the effectiveness" of the FCRA's ability "to meet
changing circumstances as they develop." Id The FCRA's effectiveness,
therefore, requires judicial enforcement of these provisions. Cf. supra note 156
(citing authority supporting proposition that courts should analyze compro-
mise legislation in light of legislative history and overall purpose).
191. See supra note 190.
192. See supra note 159 and cases cited therein.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(3) (emphasis added).
194. See Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 615 F. Supp. 299, 305 n.11
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585-87 (1981)
and Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1144 (3d
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Unlimited incorporation of the business transaction provi-
sion, however, raises conflicts with section 1681a(d)'s consumer
report definition and ignores distinct limitations on the FCRA's
scope. When incongruities between the restrictive language of
section 1681a(d) and the expansive language of section 1681b's
business transaction provision arise, section 1681a(d) should
control as the primary definitional section.' 95 Limiting com-
plete incorporation in this way maintains the Act's structure by
preserving the specificity of section 1681a(d). 196 Furthermore,
limited incorporation respects the limitations on the FCRA's
scope by not extending the Act to cover reports used for busi-
ness credit, business insurance, or insurance claims, 97 unless
they contain information originally collected for consumer
purposes.L98
When delineating the type of transactions encompassed by
the business transaction provision, courts should remain cogni-
zant of the provision's dual functions. Its primary function is
the role it plays within section 1681b, expanding the circum-
stances under which an agency may lawfully disseminate con-
sumer reports.L9 9 Secondarily, section 1681a(d) incorporates the
business transaction provision into the consumer report defini-
tion.200 Construction for one function should not be separated
from construction for the other function. 20 1 Thus, a narrow in-
Cir. 1986); see also 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 69, § 46.01, at 73-80 (citing
cases on the plain meaning rule).
195. See Cochran v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 472 F. Supp. 827, 831 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (conflicts in language between § 1681a(d) and § 1681b are resolved in
favor of § 1681a(d)); Fernandez v. Retail Credit Co., 349 F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D.
La. 1972) (section 1681a(d) is primary definitional section); Note, supra note
98, at 471 (same); see generally Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States, 322
U.S. 102, 107 (1944) (a specific statutory provision prevails over a more general
one).
196. Section 1681b's intended function of expanding the consumer report
definition is preserved and limited only in the few instances necessary to pre-
serve the specificity of § 1681a(d). This interpretation of the statute is superior
to the Houghton court's interpretation because it maintains the integrity of
both § 1681a(d) and § 1681b's business transaction provision. The Third Cir-
cuit's interpretation renders superfluous the business transaction provision.
See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 119 (first party insurance claim reports typically ex-
cluded from the FCRA's scope); see supra note 89 (business reporting is ex-
pressly excluded from the Act's scope).
198. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
200. Id § 1681a(d)(3); see supra note 20.
201. Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144, 1151 (3d Cir.
1986) (Sloviter, J., concurring).
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terpretation in the context of defining a consumer report
should be rejected to avoid unnecessarily restricting the per-
missible distribution of consumer reports,20 2 a result not in-
tended by Congress. 20 3 The business transaction provision's
scope with respect to either of its functions should be coexten-
sive with the other.
Recognizing its intended functions, the business transaction
provision should be read to cover reports made in connection
with transactions that are similar to the other types of transac-
tions enumerated in sections 1681a(d) and 1681b.20 4 The provi-
sion should not be limited, as the Houghton court proposed, to
only those transactions which relate to the enumerated transac-
202. This argument presumes a report that qualifies as a consumer report
under the collection purpose test. A report that fails to meet the collection
purpose test can be disseminated for any purpose because of the circularity of
the actual use definition. Cf supra notes 129-33 & 159-62 and accompanying
text (arguing that rejection of the collection purpose test renders §§ 1681b and
1681e(a) meaningless).
203. Congress acknowledged the business community's need to have avail-
able the type of information supplied by the reporting industry to make in-
formed decisions. See S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969); see also
supra note 42. Senator Proxmire stated that the bill was not intended to in-
hibit reporting operations or impede the reporting industry's growth. See
Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 71. Section 1681b's business transaction
provision was intended to permit continued wide-spread dissemination of con-
sumer information, provided a legitimate business need in connection with an
impending consumer transaction could be shown. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC.
36,572 (1970) (the FCRA sanctions the "free flow of information about a
consumer").
204. Under the ejusdem generis doctrine of statutory construction, when
general words follow a designation of specific items, the meaning of the gen-
eral words is construed to include only those objects of a similar character,
class, kind, or nature as the objects previously enumerated. Houghton, 795 F.2d
at 1150; see generally Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1917);
United States v. Salen, 235 U.S. 237, 249 (1914); 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note
69, § 47.17, at 166-77 (discussing the use of the ejusdem generis doctrine and
citing supporting case law). Accordingly, the business transaction provision
should be read to cover reports made in conjunction with transactions similar
to the statutorily enumerated credit, insurance, employment, and licensing
transactions. Each of these enumerated transactions involves a consumer rela-
tionship characterized by an arm's length transaction between parties. See in-
fra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. The business transaction provision
should thus be construed to cover similar transactions involving a consumer
relationship. Indeed, both the FTC and the Houghton court have recognized
that the business transaction provision contemplates transactions character-
ized by a consumer relationship. See Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opin-
ion Letter, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder] Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 99,423,
at 89,384 (May 18, 1971) (the business transaction provision "contemplates
arms length dealings" between the report's procurer and the consumer); see




tions.20 5 Congress introduced the business transaction provision
with the words "otherwise has a.. .,,206 indicating that the pro-
vision was intended to be broader than the preceding subsec-
tions.20 7 Requiring a direct relationship renders the business
transaction provision superfluous,208 improperly limiting both
205. In Houghton, the Third Circuit's focus on a consumer relationship to
interpret the business transaction provision, Houghton, 795 F.2d at 1149, was
appropriate. See supra note 204. Its holding that the provision only encom-
passes those transactions "related" to the other statutory transactions, id.,
however, was misplaced. The Third Circuit cited and claimed to adopt the rea-
soning of Cochran v. Mertropolitan Life Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ga.
1979). Houghton, 795 F.2d at 1149-50. The Cochran court, however, approved a
similarity test. See 474 F. Supp. at 831 n.3. "Similar" is not interchangeable
with "related." The latter contemplates a much closer nexus than the former.
Compare WEBSTE_'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1916 (1965) (def-
inition of "related") with id at 2120 (definition of "similar").
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(E) ("otherwise has a legitimate business need for
information in connection with a business transaction involving the
consumer").
207. When Senator Proxmire introduced the 1969 version of the Fair
Credit Reporting Bill, he asserted that § 164(f), enumerating the permissible
dissemination purposes for regulated reports, permitted distribution "for the
purpose of granting credit, providing insurance, or for employment or person-
nel purposes or for other business Purposes." 115 CONG. REc. 2414 (1969) (em-
phasis added). These purposes were intended to be covered by § 164(f)'s
language allowing release "to persons with a legitimate business need for the
information and who intend to use the information in connection with a pro-
spective consumer... transaction." Id at 2415. At the subsequent hearings
before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, witnesses emphasized
the need to clarify the bill's language and scope. See Hearings on S. 823, supra
note 35, at 149. See also i&L at 163 (Congressman McIntyre stating that "the
bill is deficient in a lack of definition"). In response, the committee redrafted
the provision, this time clearly enumerating the purposes covered: credit, em-
ployment, insurance, licensing, and other business transactions. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681b (1982). To comport with Congressional intent, therefore, the business
transaction provision must be interpreted as encompassing transactions other
than those listed in the preceding subsections. The committee's conference re-
port, summarizing the Act as redrafted, supports the foregoing interpretation.
S. REP. No. 517, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1969) (§ 1681b permits dissemination of
consumer reports for "ive purposes," credit, insurance, employment, licens-
ing, or "other legitimate business need involving a business transaction with
the consumer." (emphasis added)).
Moreover, the ordinary meaning of "otherwise" suggests the business
transaction provision should be construed broadly to include transactions
other than those enumerated. The ordinary meaning of "otherwise" is "in dif-
ferent circumstances." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
1598 (1965). Read this way, the business transaction provision covers transac-
tions in circumstances different from the credit, insurance, employment, and
licensing contexts. Statutory words should be given their ordinary meaning
absent persuasive reasons to the contrary. See supra note 149.
208. See supra note 136. Requiring a direct relationship ignores the busi-
ness transaction provision's expansive language and limits its coverage to the
previously enumerated transactions. The narrow construction of the business
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the scope of the consumer report definition 0 9 and the scope of
permissible dissemination.2 1 0
To illustrate, suppose a consumer applies to rent an apart-
ment. To assess the rental risk, the landlord asks a consumer
reporting agency to report on the individual's rental history.21 1
The agency contacted does not have the individual on file and
thus compiles the report contemporaneously.2' 2 The agency
prepares a report that contains false, derogatory personal infor-
mation obtained through interviews with former landlords.
The landlord rejects the consumer's application on the basis of
the report. The consumer seeks to rent in other buildings but
is repeatedly refused because of the same report. If the con-
sumer suspects that a negative report is the problem and can
determine the agency's identity, she is free to go to the agency,
cause a reinvestigation, and file a statement of dispute.2 13 She
will be unable, however, to require dissemination of her state-
ment,2 14 to sue the landlord for failure to notify and disclose,2 1 5
transaction provision must be rejected to preserve its effect. Cf supra note 159
(the substance and effect of a statute's provisions should be preserved).
209. Congress intended the business transaction provision to expand the
consumer report definition. See supra note 187-88 & 207 and accompanying
text.
210. See supra note 203 and text accompanying notes 202-03.
211. That a landlord would request a report on a prospective tenant is not
unlikely. In fact, most full service agencies specifically list tenant-reporting as
a distinct service. See Hearings on S. 2360, supra note 30, at 703-04.
The content of a tenant report would vary with the user's request. "Some-
times a tenant report is nothing more than a consumer credit report, sold to a
landlord. Often, however, it includes information gained from previous land-
lords." Id. at 704. A typical rental report sold by a Chicago agency "includes
family status, employment verification, trade clearances, character investiga-
tions, previous rental history, and court record review." Id
212. The report, therefore, could not satisfy the consumer report definition
under the collection purpose test because the agency did not access preexisting
information already on file.
213. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681g, 1681i; supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
The consumer may avail herself of these provisions regardless of whether a
consumer report as defined by the statute is involved.
Under § 1681i, the consumer is entitled to have the information deleted if
reinvestigation proves that the information is false or unverifiable. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681i(a). In this case, however, the false, derogatory information is not fac-
tual in nature but rather is hearsay. Thus, unless the former landlords are
willing to retract their statements, the consumer's only remedy is to file a
statement of dispute setting forth her version of the facts. See idL § 1681i(b).
214. The agency may disseminate with impunity the false information
without the consumer's statement of dispute when the communication of the
information does not qualify as a consumer report. Id. § 1681i(c).
215. The obligation to notify and disclose attaches only if a consumer re-
port is involved. Id § 1681d(a)(1); see supra note 60.
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or to sue the agency for shoddy procedures,21 6 unless she can
bring the report within the FCRA's scope.
The hypothetical represents a type of situation Congress
intended to cover.217 Congress sought to protect individuals
from being denied consumer benefits on the basis of erroneous
information.218 Under the Third Circuit's narrow interpreta-
tion of consumer report, however, the FCRA would not protect
this consumer because the rental transaction is not related to
credit, insurance, employment, or licensing.219 Under this
Comment's proposed interpretation of the Act, however, the re-
port is covered by the business transaction provision because a
rental transaction is similar to the other statutory transactions.
Similarity comprehends like characteristics, substance, and
216. If no consumer report is involved, the consumer has no right to chal-
lenge the reasonableness of the agency's procedures. Id § 1681e(b).
217. The Federal Trade Commission advocates an interpretation of the
Act's scope that would protect an individual like the hypothetical consumer:
One of the key aspects of the definition of "consumer report" is the
purpose for which the report is sought. The legislative history indi-
cates that the Act was intended to apply to reports which were ob-
tained in connection with a benefit sought by an individual for
personal, family or household use.
Excerpts from FTC Informal Staff Opinion Letter, [1969-1973 Transfer Binder]
Consumer Cred. Guide (CCH) 99,422, at 89,381 (May 18, 1971). Courts should
defer to an administrative interpretation of a statute announced by the agency
charged with its enforcement. See, e.g., NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75
(1973). The hypothetical falls under the FTC's interpretation. A consumer ap-
plying to rent an apartment is seeking a benefit for personal or family use. In-
deed, Congress appears to have anticipated the rental context for consumer
reports. The hearings held by the Senate Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency revealed that, by the reporting industry's own admission, credit and per-
sonal reports are often obtained in connection with rental decisions. Hearings
S. 823, supra note 35, at 91 (statement of Alan F. Westin, Professor, Columbia
University, citing a study compiled and released by the reporting industry dis-
cussing the uses and growth of reporting services).
218. Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, passim; see also 115 CONG. REC.
33,413 (1969) (every consumer is entitled to the benefit of accurate information
when applying for consumer benefits); Hearings on S. 2360, supra note 30, at
62 (statement by Senator Proxmire indicating that the Act is intended to apply
when there is the possibility that an individual will be denied consumer bene-
fits on the basis of erroneous information).
219. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. A "related" transac-
tion, in the sense contemplated by the Third Circuit would be one that flows
directly from a credit, insurance, employment or licensing transaction. Hough-
ton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144, 1149 (3d Cir. 1986); see also id
at 1151 (Sloviter, J., concurring) (interpreting the majority's construction of
the business transaction provision as strictly limited to the foregoing transac-
tions enumerated in §§ 1681a(d) and 1681b).
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structure.220 A rental transaction, like the other statutory
transactions, is characterized by a consumer relationship in-
volving an exchange-money for the right to possess-that ben-
efits both parties.221 Moreover, the proposed approach permits
the business transaction provision to expand the FCRA's trans-
actional scope beyond section 1681a(d)'s contours.2 22 Because
section 1681a(d)'s consumer report definition does not expressly
cover rental transactions, no conflict between sections is
presented and, therefore, the hypothetical report would fall
under the Act.223
C. REEVALUATION OF THE HOUGHTON DECISION
The issue presented by the Houghton case was whether a
report obtained by an insurer for the purpose of defending per-
sonal injury litigation against its insured was a consumer report
regulated by the FCRA.22 4 The Third Circuit held it was not.225
Application of this Comment's proposal, however, should yield
a contrary conclusion.
Under this Comment's formulation of the actual use test,
Equifax's report does not qualify as a FCRA consumer re-
port.226 Because the report was not used in connection with one
220. See WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 2120 (1965);
supra note 204.
221. The transactions covered by the statute involve a consumer relation-
ship that entails a mutual exchange of money, services, or some other benefit
that each party to the transaction finds desirable. See 116 CONG. REC. 33,413
(1969). When a consumer applies for credit, insurance, or employment, for ex-
ample, the creditor wants to sell or lend, the insurer to insure, and the em-
ployer to hire, just as the consumer wants to buy or borrow, to be insured, or
to sell services as an employee. Id The consumer report is obtained in connec-
tion with an arms length transaction between parties who both stand to bene-
fit from the transaction if consummated.
222. See supra notes 186-210 and accomanying text.
223. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (use of § 1681b's busi-
ness transaction provision to expand § 1681a(d)'s consumer report definition is
limited only when a conflict with § 1681a(d)'s language is presented).
224. See supra notes 4 & 21 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
226. The Third Circuit's actual use analysis reached the same conclusion by
the wrong reasoning. The court characterized the Equifax report as a report
obtained primarily for insurance purposes. Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins.
Co., 795 F.2d 1144, 1149-50 (3d Cir. 1986) (court relied on precedent that had
construed the business transaction provision with respect to reports "pertain-
ing to insurance"). In the court's view, a report obtained to evaluate an insur-
ance claim raises a conflict between §§ 1681a(d) and 1681b that should be
resolved in favor of § 1681a(d). See supra note 119. Based on this analysis, the
court excluded the Equifax report from the FCRA's scope. Houghton, 795 F.2d
at 1150. For this interpretation, the court relied exclusively on Cochran v.
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of the statute's specifically enumerated purposes,227 its status
under the actual use test depends on whether it was used "in
connection with a business transaction involving the con-
sumer."228 The Equifax report was not used in connection with
a business transaction similar to the statute's other transac-
tions. The Houghton litigation involved a purely adversarial re-
lationship between parties seeking conflicting resolutions of a
common problem. Other statutory transactions, conversely, in-
volve a consumer relationship entailing an exchange of money
or services that potentially benefits both parties.229 The busi-
ness transaction provision, therefore, does not extend the Act's
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ga. 1979). Houghton, 795
F.2d at 1150. For a discussion of Cochran, see supra note 98. The Cochran
opinion, however, is factually inapposite. Cochran involved a first party claim
report used to evaluate an insured's claim for disability benefits under an ex-
isting policy, see supra note 98; whereas Houghton involved a third party claim
report used for litigation purposes.
The Third Circuit failed to recognize the conceptual distinction between
the pertinent transaction involved in first party insurance claims and third
party insurance claims. In the context of a first party claim, a report is ob-
tained by an insurance company on its insured to evaluate a claim for benefits
under an existing policy. The transaction in this context is a contractual claim
by the insured for benefits from the insurer and presents a direct conflict with
the statute's apparent limitation of consumer reports for insurance transac-
tions. See supra note 119. Reports obtained in connection with first party in-
surance claims, therefore, fall outside the business transaction provision. See
supra note 119. In the context of a third party insurance claim, a report is ob-
tained by an insurance company to defend litigation brought against the com-
pany's insured. In this context, the transaction between the third party and
the insurance company is not the evaluation of a claim for benefits under a
policy. Rather, the transaction is the litigation, negotiation, or settlement of
the legal claim itself. Litigation is not covered anywhere else in the statute
and therefore raises no conflict between §§ 1681a(d) and 1681b.
The Equifax report was not a report used primarily for insurance pur-
poses, but rather a third party claim report used for litigation purposes. The
Third Circuit's mischaracterization of the report led it to perceive a conflict
between §§ 1681a(d) and 1681b. See supra note 119. This misperception pre-
cipitated the court's unnecessary and narrow interpretation of the consumer
report definition's transactional scope. See supra note 117-22 and accompany-
ing text. In the future, courts must critically evaluate the transaction underly-
ing the report's use by looking to the relationship between the report's
procurer and subject because the FCRA's applicability may turn on the court's
characterization of the underlying transaction. Compare supra note 119,
(claim report used to evaluate an insured's claim for benefits under an existing
policy is typically excluded from the Act's scope) with infra note 230 (claim
report on a third party used to evaluate a legal claim against the insurance
company's insured, or a report obtained on the insured herself to defend that
litigation, may fall within the Act's scope).
227. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(3)(E).
229. See supra note 221.
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transactional scope to cover Equifax's report used to defend
third party litigation because an underlying consumer relation-
ship between the report's user and subject was absent.2 0
230. When the parties' connection is limited to the lawsuit, then a con-
sumer relationship is absent and a report used in connection with the litigation
is not a consumer report. This is not to say that a report obtained in connec-
tion with litigation is never covered. This Comment's approach classifies re-
ports used in connection with litigation as consumer reports in at least two
contexts. First, when a consumer relationship between parties gives rise to a
dispute that culminates in litigation, this Comment's interpretation of the con-
sumer report definition classifies a report obtained by one party or her insurer
on the third party to defend the litigation as one used "in connection with a
business transaction involving the consumer." At least one court, faced with a
report used in connection with litigation that arose out of a contractual dispute
between the report's procurer and subject, has decided the report's status in-
correctly. In Daniels v. Retail Credit Co., No. 72-CV-484 (N.D.N.Y. April 18,
1976) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file), the plaintiff sued his architects and
contractor after a dispute arose during the construction of the plaintiff's new
home. CNA Insurance Company, who was required to defend the architects
under a professional liability policy, requested a report containing financial
and character information on the plaintiff. In a subsequent suit against the
consumer reporting agency, the district court held that the report was not cov-
ered by the consumer report definition's business transaction provision be-
cause, in the court's view, litigation did not constitute a business transaction
within the meaning of the Act. Id
The Daniels court sought to justify its holding of no consumer report by
focusing on the absence of a direct relationship between Daniels and CNA, the
report's procurer. The court maintained that the case presented a "three party
situation"-Daniels sued his architects and the architects' insurer in turn re-
quested the report on Daniels-distinguishable from a two-party situation
characterized by a consumer relationship. Id The court found it necessary to
distinguish Beresh v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 260, 261 (C.D. Ca. 1973),
which held that a report requested by an insurer on its insured was encom-
passed by the business transaction provision and thus fell within the consumer
report definition. See supra note 119. The court apparently believed that had
Daniels's architects requested the report instead of the architects' insurer, the
report would have been covered by the business transaction provision. The
court's distinction, however, is dubious in light of the identity of interest be-
tween an insurer and its insured. The court thus erred in elevating the form
of CNA and Daniels's relationship over its substance.
Moreover, the court failed to analyze critically the transaction underlying
the litigation. The pertinent transaction in Daniels was plaintiff Daniels's con-
tract to purchase the services of the architects and contractor. That transac-
tion, like the FCRA's other statutory transactions, was characterized by a
consumer relationship involving an exchange of money for services that the
parties found mutually beneficial. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
Under this Comment's construction of the business transaction provision,
therefore, the report was a consumer report because it was used to defend liti-
gation that resulted from a transaction between the parties that is similar to
the other statutory transactions. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying
text.
The second context in which this Comment's approach would cover a re-
port used in connection with litigation occurs where an insurer obtains a re-
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The Equifax report would have been a consumer report,
however, under the collection purpose test. The collection pur-
pose language should have been applied to the insurance com-
pany because it had reason to know that it was securing a
consumer report.231 The insurance company requested financial
port on its insured primarily for the purpose of defending the insured in
litigation. For example, in Houghton, if the insurance company had obtained a
report on its insured, Rosenfeld, to defend against Houghton's suit, the report
would have constituted a consumer report and the insurance company would
have been obligated to comply with the Act with respect to Rosenfeld. The
actual use of the report would have brought it within the statutory definition
of consumer report because the report would have been used in connection
with the company's contractual duty to defend its insured. The right to a de-
fense is part of the consumer benefits purchased with the policy, and thus the
company would have obtained a report in connection with a business transac-
tion involving its insured. See Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 299, 313-18(Mr. Melvin L. Stark, representing the American Insurance Association, indi-
cated that the consumer's defensibility in litigation is a factor which insurance
companies deem highly relevant in deciding whether to write a policy. From
the insurance industry's perspective, therefore, litigation is very much a part
of their business.). Moreover, covering the hypothetical report under § 1681b's
business transaction provision would not conflict with § 1681a(d)'s consumer
report definition's limited coverage of reports for insurance purposes, because
the report would be used primarily for litigation purposes, not insurance pur-
poses. Absent a direct conflict with § 1681a(d), the Act can be expanded by
§ 1681b's business transaction provision to cover this hypothetical report. See
supra notes 183-98 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. This assumes that the in-
surance company failed to prove that Equifax differentiated their regulated
and nonregulated services. In fact, Equifax argued in its amicus brief that its
report to the insurance company was not a consumer report under the FCRA,
because it maintained differentiated services. See Brief For Amicus Curiae,
Equifax Services, Inc. at 5-8, Houghton v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d
1144 (3rd Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1601). Equifax claimed that its consumer reporting
division remained separate from and inaccessable to its claim division. Id If
the insurance company could prove knowledge of Equifax's alleged business
practices, the insurance company could not be held to assume that a request
for general financial information would be filled by accessing existing files
originally collected for statutory purposes. See infra notes 232-33 and accom-
panying text (structure of industry requires assumption that regulated infor-
mation will be received when financial information is requested). Thus, the
collection purpose test would not apply, and the report would not be a con-
sumer report with respect to the insurance company.
The result may differ, however, if Equifax were the defendant. Equifax
would have to prove that the integrity of its separate files had been preserved.
In a suit brought by the FTC against Equifax, the administrative judge found
that Equifax in fact used its file information interchangeably and thus was us-
ing consumer report information in its claim reports. See In re Equifax Inc.,
96 F.T.C. 844, 990 (1980), rev'd in par4 678 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir. 1982). In re-
gard to the Houghton report, Equifax's investigator lacked "a present recollec-
tion of either the confidential source or the 'credit files' referred to" but
further claimed that "credit files" could only mean public record financial in-
formation. Brief for Amicus Curiae, Equifax Services, Inc., at 8, Houghton v.
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information which it should have assumed would be provided
from preexisting files, 2 32 presumptively collected for statutory
purposes. 233 Without having requested that Equifax compile
the credit data contemporaneously with the request,23 the in-
surance company should have known it would receive a con-
New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144 (3rd Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1601); see
supra note 8 (quoting the claim report's reference to files searched). Although
Equifax subsequently instructed its investigators to maintain file integrity,
Equifax, 96 F.T.C. at 990-91, its prior practice casts doubt on the respectability
of Equifax's differentiated structure. Moreover, the substantial inadequacies
in Equifax's overall procedures revealed by the FTC investigation, cast further
doubt, making the information's source an issue for trial. See id. at 1112-14
(ordering Equifax to cease and desist from disseminating consumer reports for
unauthorized purposes; using quotas, awards, punishments, or other competi-
tive pressures to encourage employees to produce a specified number or pro-
portion of adverse reports; misrepresenting to the consumer his right to obtain
disclosure or failing to disclose; and refusing to reinvestigate legitimately dis-
puted items).
232. When requesting general financial information on a consumer, the re-
questing party should assume that the information will come from preexisting
files. The number of individuals on file with agencies across the country is
staggering. See supra note 40. The industry's scope is further enhanced by
agencies' interconnected computerized systems that guarantee the availability
of vast amounts of information quickly and efficiently to report users any-
where in the country. See Hearings on S. 823, supra note 35, at 146, 148 (Asso-
ciated Credit Bureaus, Inc., whose member agencies dominate the industry,
has an interbureau information exchange system available to all subscribing
members); Privacy Hearings, supra note 32, at 68, 74 (H. C. Jordan, President
of Credit Data Corp., testifying that consumer information is available within
two minutes to the requesting party from anywhere in the country). More-
over, the industry objective is to maximize profitability by decreasing the cost
of producing information, which is achieved through repeated use. The entire
concept of the reporting industry, therefore, is based on collecting information
to be reused in subsequent reports as many times as possible. Hearings on S.
823, supra note 35, at 149-50.
Equifax is no exception to this general rule. Formerly known as Retail
Credit Co., Equifax is the largest consumer reporting agency in the United
States, maintaining approximately 300 branch offices and 1,500 other offices lo-
cated in every state. Equifax, 96 F.T.C. at 845-46 (citing FTC's complaint).
"Through its nationwide network of offices, [Equifax] has the capacity to pro-
vide information on 98 percent of the population of the United States." Id. at
846.
233. See supra note 151.
234. Such a request would have avoided a search of preexisting data and
consumer report status under the collection purpose test. The insurance com-
pany also argued that the record only indicated that "available credit files"
had been searched, which was too vague to decide whether the search had cov-
ered Houghton's files, or only general credit files on others, in which no infor-
mation on Houghton had been found. Brief of Appellant at 33, Houghton v.
New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 795 F.2d 1144 (3rd Cir. 1986) (No. 85-1601). The in-
surance company, however, requested financial information on Houghton and,
therefore, it should have assumed that a search of Equifax's preexisting files
collected for statutory purposes would be made. See supra note 151.
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sumer report.235  Because the company also requested
information that could only be collected through an investiga-
tion within the meaning of the FCRA's investigative consumer
report definition,236 the insurance company should have been
liable for failing to notify Houghton when the report was re-
quested, as required by section 1681d.237
This Comment's approach also raises new theories of liabil-
ity in the Houghton case. Because the business transaction pro-
vision's dual functions-defining a consumer report and
delineating permissible dissemination-are defined cotermi-
nously,238 litigation absent a consumer relationship is not a per-
missible dissemination purpose.239 Assuming that a subscriber
agreement bound the insurance company to authorized uses
only, the company improperly accessed its Equifax account,
thus obtaining the consumer report under false pretenses in vi-
olation of the Act.240 Alternatively, if the subscriber agreement
did not bind the insurance company to authorized uses or if
there was no subscriber agreement, Equifax violated sections
1681b and 1681e by not using reasonable procedures to ensure
the release and use of consumer reports for authorized pur-
poses only.241
235. The insurance company, an entity dealing with consumer reporting
agencies on a regular basis, should be charged with knowledge of agency pro-
cedures. The consumer report definition was fulfilled by the company's re-
quest for financial data on Houghton, because the insurance company should
have assumed that the data would be supplied from preexisting files. See
supra note 232.
236. See supra note 21.
237. 15 U.S.C. § 1681d.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 199-203.
239. See sulpra text accompanying notes 226-30.
240. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681q; see Boothe v. TRW Credit Data, 557 F. Supp. 66,
70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding user liable for willfully obtaining information
under false pretenses in violation of § 1681q where the user obtained a report
for nonstatutory purpose, violating its subscriber agreement in which the user
certified that it would use the agency's reports for credit transactions only);
Hansen v. Morgan, 582 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that when a
user obtains a consumer report under a subscriber's agreement that binds the
user to permissible uses only, failure to disclose its impermissible purpose can
constitute a violation of § 1681q); cf. Russell v. Shelter Fin. Servs., 604 F. Supp.
201, 203 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding that when a user requests a consumer report
for a nonstatutory purpose it has "willfully violated the FCRA as a matter of
law"). A violation of § 1681q, a criminal provision, "forms the basis of civil lia-
bility under either § 1681n or § 1681o," and thus the consumer has a cause of
action against the report's user. See Hansen4 582 F.2d at 1219.
241. Because the intended use of the report was clearly disclosed to
Equifax in the insurance company's request, see supra note 4, a court should
find subsequent release to be a clear violation of § 1681b and § 1681e(a). See
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CONCLUSION
Through the FCRA, Congress enunciated a comprehensive
public policy in the area of consumer reporting. Congress en-
deavored to strike an equitable balance between consumers' in-
terests in accuracy, privacy, and confidentiality and the need
for the valuable services afforded by the consumer reporting in-
dustry. Although the Act offers consumers the potential for
substantial protections from the burgeoning, often overly intru-
sive consumer reporting industry, this potential has gone un-
realized. Judicial interpretations of the FCRA's scope have
short-changed consumers and rendered the Act impotent to
achieve Congress's objectives.
This Comment's proposed analysis resolves existing judicial
confusion and provides a consistent interpretation of the
FCRA, yet maintains the integrity of the Act's language and
structure. Courts should employ both the actual use and collec-
tion purpose tests in every FCRA case, modified as suggested
when the defendant is a report user. This Comment provides a
new approach to effectuate Congress's goals and to revive the
long overdue consumer protections the FCRA intended to pro-
vide in the consumer reporting area.
Mary A. Bernard
supra note 80 and accompanying text (FTC's guidelines for reasonable proce-
dures to ensure authorized use only).
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